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ESSAY 1 ABSTRACT 
 
Prior research indicates that equity markets assign a higher valuation to firms that sustain 
a string of earnings increases (earnings string) and a string of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings 
expectations (MBE string). However, to date, there is little evidence on the response of debt 
investors when firms sustain a long string of meeting/beating earnings benchmarks. This study 
fills the gap in the literature by analyzing the impact of sustaining an earnings string/MBE string 
on the cost of debt. I find evidence of a positive (negative) association between the length of the 
earnings string/MBE string and the bond yield spreads (credit ratings). These results suggest that 
debt holders assess a higher risk to firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks and require 
a higher risk premium, contrary to equity holders, who reward firms that sustain a string of earnings 
benchmarks. Additional analyses indicate that this discrepancy is attributable to the different 
investor compositions between debt and equity markets. 
  
vii 
 
 
ESSAY 2 ABSTRACT 
 
This study extends the existing literature by investigating the impact of sustaining a string 
of earnings increases (earnings string) on stock returns using the time-series asset pricing approach. 
Using both Fama-French (1993) three-factor and Carhart (1997) four-factor models, I find that the 
average abnormal return of a zero investment arbitrage portfolio that longs the highest earnings 
string portfolio and shorts the lowest earnings string portfolio is approximately negative 65 (75) 
basis points per month. These results provide further insight into the existing literature by 
demonstrating that earnings string firms initially experience higher stock returns. However, as 
earnings strings become longer, the market reaction becomes weaker. 
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ESSAY 1:  SUSTAINING A STRING OF EARNINGS BENCHMARKS: A DOUBLE 
EDGED SWORD 
ESSAY 1 CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Existing research finds that managers have strong incentives to beat several earnings 
benchmarks. Among these earnings benchmarks, reporting earnings increases (beating quarterly 
earnings for the same quarter last year) and beating analysts’ earnings expectations are considered 
two of the most important earnings benchmarks (Brown and Caylor, 2005; Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal, 2005). Prior studies provide several reasons for managerial incentives to report earnings 
increases and to beat analysts’ earnings expectations. For example, Brown and Caylor (2005) find 
that firms reporting an earnings increase are more likely to experience higher abnormal returns 
around quarterly earnings announcement dates. Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002) confirm that 
quarterly abnormal returns are positively associated with the earnings surprise for firms that meet 
or beat current analysts’ earnings expectations. Further, Graham et al. (2005) find that 80% of 
surveyed executives believe that beating earnings benchmarks, such as an earnings increase and 
the analysts’ earnings expectations, help to maintain or increase a firm’s stock price. Conversely, 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) determine that firms that fail to meet earnings benchmarks suffer large 
negative price reactions on the earnings announcement date, and Matsunaga and Park (2001) find 
that a CEO’s bonus is lower if a firm fails to reach analysts’ earnings expectations and quarterly 
earnings from the prior year. Finally, Farrell and Whidbee (2003) confirm that CEO turnover rate 
is higher when a firm fails to reach earnings benchmarks. 
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Looking at the long-term earnings performance (cumulative perspective), behavioral 
finance theory argues that investors fixate on earnings momentum, such that investors expect a 
positive trend to continue and are therefore negatively surprised when this trend finally breaks 
(Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). Similarly, Jensen (2005) argues that once a manager starts 
playing this “beating earnings benchmarks game” and enjoys the benefits of beating earnings 
benchmarks, it is nearly impossible to stop since managers must continue to convince investors 
that the firm is worth its valuation. Empirically, Barth, Elliot, and Finn (1999) find that firms 
reporting consecutive earnings increases are priced at a premium relative to firms without this 
pattern. Koonce and Lipe (2010) determine that investors rely on earnings benchmarks only when 
they are consistent over time.  Myers, Myers, and Skinner (2007) find that firms reporting at least 
20 quarters of earnings increases have higher abnormal returns. Further, Kasnik and McNichols 
(2002) and Bartov et al. (2002) confirm that the equity market assigns a higher valuation to firms 
that consistently meet or beat analysts’ earnings expectations and beat earnings for the same 
quarter last year. Ke (2004) notes that CEOs who hold high equity-based incentives are more likely 
to manage earnings in order to report a longer string of consecutive earnings increases. Finally, 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996), Skinner and Sloan (2002), Barth et al. (1999), Kim 
(2002), and Xie (2010) find that there is a decrease in expectations of future cash flows and a larger 
negative stock price reaction when firms eventually break their earnings benchmark strings. 
Overall, prior studies have primarily focused on the equity market effects and incentives 
associated with beating earnings benchmarks, with little evidence on whether and how the debt 
market responds to beating earnings benchmarks. Ball, Robin, and Sadka (2008) argue that unlike 
equity holders who are able to create portfolio diversification in order to avoid potential risks, debt 
holders tend to lend money to individual firms with specific debt covenants. Consequently, debt 
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holders are more likely than equity holders to demand timely earnings information because many 
debt covenants are written in terms of earnings variables. Thus, earnings information is more 
relevant to the debt holders than to the equity holders because debt holders have relatively higher 
undiversifiable risk. In fact, Holthausen and Watts (2001) document that FASB statements about 
the use of financial statement do not suggest any primacy for equity holders. Rather, FASB 
considers both external investors and creditors to be the main users of financial statement. 
Empirically, both Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) find that credit 
agencies, debt holders, or bank loan officers use earnings benchmarks as heuristics to evaluate 
firms’ performance. Datta and Dhillon (1993) find that similar to stock returns, bond returns are 
positively associated with the content of earnings announcements, suggesting that debt holders, 
like equity holders, may also use earnings benchmarks to evaluate a firm’s performance. Moreover, 
investigating the influence of beating earnings benchmarks on the debt market is important as firms 
increasingly rely on debt financing while issuing less equity (Thomson Financial, 2004). 
According to the statistics from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA), by the end of 2016, the bond market has more than tripled in size relative to the equity 
market.  
Jiang (2008) investigates the effects of beating earnings benchmarks on the debt market, 
and finds that firms that meet or beat earnings benchmarks have a lower cost of debt relative to 
firms that fail to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. These results suggest that debt holders react 
in the same way as equity holders to the firms that meet or beat earnings benchmarks. However, 
Jiang (2008) examines the effects of beating earnings benchmarks on debt markets only from a 
static perspective, and does not focus on the effects of sustaining a string of earnings benchmarks 
on debt markets. In other words, Jiang (2008) simply compares the firms that meet or beat earnings 
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benchmarks to the firms that fail to do so. However, from a cumulative perspective, it is still not 
known whether and how debt markets react differently from equity markets to firms that sustain a 
string of earnings benchmarks. Investigating the influence of sustaining a string of earnings 
benchmarks on the cost of debt is important because sustaining a string of earnings benchmarks 
may highlight at least two issues that may counteract the benefits of meeting or beating earnings 
benchmarks and result in an increase in the firm’s cost of debt. 
          First, sustaining a string of earnings benchmarks increases agency issues. Debt holders have 
a fixed claim against a company’s market value, and as such bear the risk of the company’s default, 
but do not share the company’s upside growth (Fischer and Verrecchia, 1997; Plummer and Tse, 
1999). Thus, debt holders explicitly require the use of conservative accounting in order to maintain 
a stabilized future cash flows (Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Stanford-Harris, 2002). However, 
equity holders pay more attention to firms’ future growth rather than default risk. This can be 
explained by the fact that equity holders have unbounded upside potential for future cash flow, but 
have bounded downside potential due to limited liability (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Empirically, 
extensive prior studies find that the equity market assigns higher valuations to the firms that sustain 
a string of earnings benchmarks because a string of earnings increases signal a firm’s competitive 
advantage and higher likelihood of future earnings growth (e.g., Barth et al. 1999; Kasznik and 
McNichols, 2002; Bartove et al. 2002; Myers et al., 2007). From managers’ perspective, Penman 
(2003) argues that managers view equity holders as primary “customers”. As such, managers are 
forced to engage in increasingly aggressive accounting in order to match equity holders’ 
“unrealistic expectations” regarding the firm’s growth prospects.  
         Further, extensive prior studies document that the only way for managers to meet or beat 
earnings benchmarks consistently is to manipulate their numbers and mask the inherent uncertainty 
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in their business by using various types of earnings manipulation strategies (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Jensen, 2005; Chung, Firth, and Kim, 2005; Myers et al., 2007; Hadani, Goranova, 
and Khan, 2011). Khurana and Raman (2003) argue that given the entitlement to fixed claims, debt 
holders tend to focus on the creditworthiness of bond issuers. If managers cannot accurately and 
promptly convey important information to the debt holders, they tend to be viewed by debt holders 
as high credit risk borrowers and are required to pay a risk premium for the additional risks. 
Moreover, unlike equity markets, debt markets are largely dominated by institutional investors and 
credit rating agencies (Khurana and Raman, 2003). Jiang (2008) finds that approximately 95% of 
debt holders consist of institutional investors who are more sophisticated and able to access firm-
specific information. Similarly, credit agencies, excluded from the SEC’s Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (2001), have access to firms’ nonpublic information (Ederington and Yawitz, 1987; 
SEC, 2003; Jorion, Liu, and Shi, 2005).1 Given their ability to access more valuable information 
regarding a firm’s prospects, debt holders and credit agencies are therefore more likely to 
recognize managers’ opportunistic behavior and ask for a higher risk premium.  
          Second, sustaining a string of earnings benchmarks increases potential default risk. For a 
firm that sustains a string of earnings benchmarks, problems may arise when the firm breaks its 
string. Investors might assume that there are potentially serious financial problems at the firm so 
that it cannot generate enough income to consistently hit earnings benchmarks (Graham et al. 
2005). Agapova and Mailibayeva (2016) argue that investors overweigh string signals and under-
weigh a firm’s accrual performance. Thus, the break of an earnings string is likely to cause a 
substantial negative market response. Consistent with these arguments, prior studies find that break 
in the string of earnings benchmarks is associated with decreases in expectations of future cash 
                                                 
1 Regulation Fair Disclosure (2001) prohibits firms from revealing material and valuable information to any individual 
or certain entities. 
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flows and a disproportionately large negative market response, which could reduce bond yield and 
increase the default risk dramatically (DeAngelo et al., 1996; Kwan, 1996; Dichev, 1998; Barth et 
al., 1999; Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008; Xie, 2010).  
         Ke and Petroni (2004) find that institutional investors are able to predict a break in a string 
of consecutive quarterly earnings increases at least one quarter in advance, thereby avoiding the 
economically significant negative stock response, since institutional investors are able to access 
information that is more valuable regarding a firm’s prospects. Approximately 95% of debt holders 
consist of institutional investors who are more sophisticated and able to assess firm-specific 
information (Jiang, 2008). Thus, debt holders are also more likely to recognize the risks associated 
with the break in string of earnings benchmarks and demand a higher bond premium. 
Moreover, regulators also pay more attention to the firms that sustain a string of earnings 
benchmarks. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement division’s chief 
accountant, Charles Niemeier (2002), stated that a pattern of narrowly meeting or beating analysts’ 
estimates and reporting consistent revenue increases was among the characteristics that the SEC 
used in identifying possible accounting irregularities (Bryan-Low, 2002). 2  Empirically, by 
analyzing a sample of firms subject to SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement releases 
(AAER firms), Chu, Dechow, Hui, and Wang (2016) find that a large proportion of AAER firms 
have positive earnings strings, suggesting that the firms that sustain a string of earnings 
benchmarks are more likely to draw attention from regulators. Further, extensive prior studies find 
that the firms that experience litigation have higher default risk (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Arena 
and Julio, 2011; Yuan and Zhang, 2015). Taken together, from a debt holder’s perspective, there 
                                                 
2 According to the Wall Street Journal, 9% of Standard & Poor 500 firms have consistently met or beaten Wall Street 
analysts’ earnings estimates by a penny or two over nine quarters since 2002. 
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are very limited benefits from firms’ sustaining a string of earnings benchmarks, but potentially 
higher default risk.  
In summary, I argue that, relative to equity holders, debt holders are more likely to view 
firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks as risky borrowers and require a risk premium. 
Thus, I hypothesize that the length of a string of meeting/beating earnings benchmarks is positively 
associated with the cost of debt. To address this issue, I utilize two earnings benchmark strings as 
the variable of interest: meet/beat earnings string and MBE analyst forecast string. An earning 
string is defined as a sequence of quarters in which a firm’s earnings before income taxes are 
higher than those of the same fiscal quarter from the previous year. An MBE string is defined as a 
sequence of quarters in which a firm’s actual earnings meet or beat analysts’ most recent consensus 
forecasts before the quarterly earnings announcement date. Further, following prior studies 
(Sengupta, 1998; Ahmed et al., 2002; Shi, 2003; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2005), I 
use both firm’s bond yield spread and credit rating as proxies for the cost of debt. I posit that the 
length of earnings string/MBE string is associated with a higher bond yield spread and a lower 
credit rating. 
Consistent with my hypotheses, I find that the length of an earnings string is associated 
with a higher cost of debt resulting in higher bond yield spreads and lower credit ratings. I also 
find that this association is attenuated, but does not disappear after controlling for both accrual-
based and real earnings management proxies, suggesting that the positive relation between the 
length of an earning string and the cost of debt is not entirely attributable to managers’ 
opportunistic behaviors. For the MBE string sample, I find that the length of a MBE string is 
associated with lower credit ratings, but do not find support using yield spreads to measure the 
cost of debt. This result may be due to a greater (lower) reliance on earnings (MBE) for debt 
8 
holders relative to equity holders (Jiang, 2008). More importantly, consistent with prior studies, I 
find that the length of an earnings/MBE string is positively associated with the cumulative 
abnormal returns/buy-hold abnormal returns within three-day windows around the earnings 
announcement dates. Overall, these results indicate equity holders reward firms that sustain a string 
of earnings/MBE string, while debt holders attribute higher default risk to firms that sustain a string 
of earnings benchmarks and accordingly increase the cost of debt. 
To further determine whether debt holders also consider the potential risks associated with 
the likelihood of a break in earnings strings as a result of high proportion of institutional investors 
who are able to access more private information, I limit the sample to string firms and exclude all 
non-string observations. I find that the shorter distance from each earnings string quarter to the 
string break quarter, the greater the bond yield spread. These results suggest that debt holders are 
also able to predict the break of an earnings string and require a risk premium to offset the potential 
negative market response associated with this break. This result is consistent with Ke and Petroni 
(2004) showing that institutional investors are also able to predict a break in the earnings string in 
order to avoid the potential future risks. Next, I test whether equity holders’ positive reaction to 
the firms that sustain earnings string is attributable to low proportion of institutional investor in 
the equity market relative to debt market. Interestingly, I find that the positive association between 
the length of earnings string and cumulative abnormal returns/buy-hold abnormal returns is 
attenuated by the level of institutional ownership. This result further suggest that the difference in 
reaction between equity holders and debt holders to the firms that sustain a string of earnings 
benchmarks is attributable to the difference in investor composition between equity market and 
bond market.  
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This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, to my knowledge, this is the 
first study to investigate whether the debt market reacts differently from the equity market to firms 
that sustain a string of meeting/beating earnings benchmarks. In particular, my study provides 
evidence that firms that sustain a string of meeting/beating earnings benchmarks have higher 
abnormal returns from the equity market, while they also experience an increased cost of debt from 
the debt market. Additional tests show that the different reaction between equity holders and debt 
holders to the firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks is attributable to the different 
investor composition between equity market and bond market. In addition, my study extends Jiang 
(2008) by testing the relation between beating earnings benchmarks and the cost of debt. In 
particular, while Jiang (2008) simply compares firms that meet or beat earnings benchmarks to 
firms that fail to do so, my study investigates the influence of sustaining a string of earnings 
benchmarks on the cost of debt, and finds that the length of the earnings benchmarks string is 
positively associated with the cost of debt. These results suggest that sustaining a string of earnings 
benchmarks has an opposite impact on the cost of debt, counteracting the benefit of meeting or 
beating earnings benchmarks. My findings suggest that future studies investigating the relation 
between earnings benchmarks and the cost of debt should consider the length of the earnings 
benchmark string. Moreover, my findings extend Ke and Petroni (2004) by demonstrating that 
bondholders, like institutional investors in the equity market, are also able to predict a break in the 
earnings/MBE string and, as such, require a higher risk premium. 
This study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the prior literature and develops the 
research hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes the sample selection and research design. Chapter 4 
reports the descriptive statistics. Chapter 5 provides the main results. Chapter 6 reports the results 
of additional and robustness tests, while Chapter 7 provides the conclusions. 
10 
 
 
ESSAY1 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
Extensive prior studies in both the accounting and finance literature find that managers 
have strong incentives to meet or beat several earnings benchmarks including quarterly earnings 
for the same quarter last year, analysts’ consensus expectations, and loss avoidance (Burgstahler 
and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999). Brown and Caylor (2005) find that 
either reporting earnings increases or beating analysts’ expectations leads to the highest three-day 
abnormal returns around the quarterly earnings announcement date. In addition, by surveying 401 
financial executives, Graham et al. (2005) confirm that CFOs primarily consider two key earnings 
benchmarks: quarterly earnings for the same quarter last year analysts’ consensus estimates. Thus, 
my paper only focuses on these two earnings benchmarks. 
Prior studies in the earnings benchmark literature can be classified into two groups. The 
first group, from a static perspective, investigates the motivations and consequences of meeting or 
beating earnings benchmarks. Specifically, prior studies provide several motivations as to why 
managers exercise accounting discretion to achieve earnings benchmarks. One motivation is stock 
price consideration. Graham et al. (2005) find that 80% of surveyed CFOs believe that meeting or 
beating earnings benchmarks helps maintain or increase a firm’s stock price. Bartov et al. (2002) 
confirm that quarterly abnormal returns are positively associated with quarterly earnings that 
meeting or beating current analysts’ earnings expectations. Further, Brown and Caylor (2005) find 
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that firms reporting a profit, reporting an earnings increase, or beating analysts’ earnings 
expectations are more likely to experience higher abnormal returns around quarterly earnings 
announcement dates relative to firms fail to meet or beat those earnings benchmarks. Conversely, 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) determine that firms that fail to meet quarterly earnings expectations 
suffer large negative price reactions on their earnings announcement dates. Similarly, Lopez and 
Rees (2002) find that market penalties for missing analysts’ earnings forecasts are significantly 
greater in absolute terms than the response to beating analysts’ forecasts suggesting that missing 
analysts’ earnings forecasts causes a disproportionately large negative stock price decline. Another 
motivation concerns executives’ bonuses and career considerations. Matsunaga and Park (2001) 
find that a CEO’s bonus plan is lower if a firm fails to reach analysts’ forecasts and fails to reach 
the quarterly earnings from the prior year. Farrell and Whidbee (2003) confirm that CEO turnover 
is higher if a firm fails to reach analysts’ expectations. Graham et al. (2005) determine that more 
than three-fourths of surveyed CFOs agree or strongly agree that their career is decidedly tied to 
earnings benchmarks. 
The second group, from a cumulative perspective, investigates the motivations and 
consequences of sustaining a string of earnings benchmarks. From the investors’ perspective, 
Barberis et al. (1998) provide an analytical model demonstrating that when a positive earnings 
surprise is followed by another positive surprise, investors raise the likelihood that they are in a 
trending regime. Thus, investors expect this positive trend to continue and are negatively surprised 
when this trend finally breaks. Empirically, by using 100 MBA students as experimental 
participants, Koonce and Lipe (2010) find that investors rely on earnings benchmarks only when 
they are consistent over time. From a manager’s perspective, Jensen (2005) suggests that once a 
manager starts playing this “beating earnings benchmark game” and enjoys the benefits of beating 
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benchmarks, it is nearly impossible to stop as managers must continue to convince investors that 
the firm is worth its valuation. Consistent with Jensen’s (2005) argument, Barth et al. (1999) 
confirm that firms reporting consecutive earning increases are priced at a premium relative to firms 
without this pattern. Myers et al. (2007) find that firms reporting at least 20 quarters of earnings 
increases have higher abnormal returns before their positive strings are broken. Similarly, both 
Kasnik and McNichols (2002) and Bartov et al. (2002) determine that the equity market assigns a 
higher valuation to firms that consistently meet or beat analysts’ expectations and consistently beat 
the earnings for the same quarter last year. Further, Ke (2004) finds that CEOs who hold high 
equity-based incentives are more likely to manage earnings in order to report a longer string of 
consecutive earnings increases. Conversely, Barth et al. (1999) find that firms sustaining 
consecutive increases in earnings experience significant stock price declines upon breaking the 
earnings string. Similarly, Kim (2002) confirms that there is an appropriately large negative market 
reaction when firms eventually break their MBE string. Xie (2010) extends Kim (2002) by 
showing that breaking a MBE string is associated with both decreases in expectations of future 
cash flows and increases in the cost of equity capital. 
Overall, prior studies in the earnings benchmark literature mainly investigate the equity 
market effects of beating earnings benchmarks, while there is little evidence regarding the debt 
market effects of beating earnings benchmarks. Investigating the influence of beating earnings 
benchmarks on the debt market is important. First, earnings information is more relevant to debt 
holders than to the equity holders. Ball et al. (2008) argue that unlike equity holders who are able 
to create portfolio diversification in order to avoid potential risk, debt holders tend to lend money 
to an individual firm and have higher undiversifiable risk. Thus, debt holders might pay more 
attention to firm’s financial statements. In addition, debt holders are more likely than equity 
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holders to demand timely earnings information because many debt covenants are written in terms 
of periodic earnings variables such as interest coverage ratio and financial/operating leverage. 
Empirically, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) find that credit agencies, 
bondholders, or bank loan officers also use earnings benchmarks as heuristics to evaluate firms’ 
performance. Datta and Dhillon (1993) find that similar to stock returns, bond returns are 
positively associated with the content of earnings announcements, suggesting that debt holders, 
like equity holders, may also use earnings benchmarks to evaluate a firm’s performance. Second, 
firms increasingly rely on debt financing, while issuing less equity (Thomson Financial, 2004). 
The flow of fund data from the Federal Reserve System indicates that over the past decade, there 
has been $780 billion in net debt security issuances and only $2 billion for equities (Graham et al. 
2008). According to the statistics from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA), by the end of 2016, the bond market has more than tripled in size relative to the equity 
market.  
Jiang (2008) empirically investigates the influence of beating earnings benchmarks (e.g., 
quarterly earnings from last year, analysts’ earnings expectations, and zero earnings) on the debt 
market and finds that firms that beat earnings benchmarks experience lower costs of debt relative 
to firms that fail to beat those earnings benchmarks. However, Jiang (2008) explores the influence 
of beating earnings benchmarks on the debt market only from a static perspective. In other words, 
Jiang (2008) simply compares firms that beat earnings benchmarks to firms that fail to do so. From 
a cumulative perspective, it is still unknown how debt holders respond to firms that sustain a string 
of earnings benchmarks. Investigating the influence of sustaining a string of earnings benchmarks 
on debt markets is important as sustaining a string of earnings benchmarks may cause at least two 
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issues that potentially counteract the benefits of beating earnings benchmarks: 1) increasing 
agency problems and 2) increasing potential default risks. 
 
2.2 Agency Problems 
Debt holders have a fixed claim against companies’ market value. As such, they bear a 
company’s credit risk, but do not share in the company’s upside growth (Fischer and Verrecchia, 
1997; Plummer and Tse, 1999). Thus, debt holders have unlimited downside risk and limited 
upside potential (Elliott, moon. and Ghosh, 2010). Therefore, debt holders explicitly require the 
use of conservative accounting in order to maintain a stabilized future cash flows (Ahmed et al. 
2002). However, equity holders pay more attentions to firms’ future growth rather than default risk 
because equity holders have unbounded upside potential for future cash flow, but have bounded 
downside potential due to limited liability (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Prior studies find that 
equity market returns do reward firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks because 
investors view stocks with a history of consistent earnings growth as growth stocks. (Barth et al. 
1999; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Myers et al., 2007). Jensen (2005) argues that in order to 
satisfy equity holders’ expectations, managers must continue to convince equity holders that the 
firm is worth its high valuation by sustaining a string of earnings benchmarks. This will inevitably 
increase the pressure on managers to focus on equity holders’ interests rather than debt holders’ 
interests. Similarly, Penman (2003) argues that managers view debt holders as primary “customers.” 
As such, managers are forced to engage in increasingly aggressive accounting in order to match 
equity holders’ “unrealistic expectations” regarding the firm’s growth prospects. Thus, only equity 
holders are able to obtain significant benefits from sustaining a string of earnings benchmarks, 
while debt holders obtain very limited benefits from it. 
15 
Khurana and Raman (2003) argue that given the entitlement to fixed claims and the relative 
importance of the face value of a bond, debt holders tend to focus on the creditworthiness of the 
issuers. Thus, if borrowers can not accurately and promptly convey important earnings information 
to the debt holders, they tend to be viewed by debt holders as high credit risk borrowers and asked 
for a higher yield. Extensive prior studies confirm that debt holders use earnings and other 
accounting information to assess a firm’s health, credibility, and variability (Ederington and 
Yawitz, 1987; Fischer and Verrecchia, 1997; Khurana and Ramen, 2003). Standard & Poor’s (1998, 
24-25) ranks earnings ahead of cash flow in its listing of financial factors relevant in assessing 
creditworthiness and notes that profitability and the ongoing earnings power of a firm are critical 
determinants of credit protection. However, Jensen (2005) argues that the only way for managers 
to meet earning benchmarks consistently is to manipulate their numbers to mask the inherent 
uncertainty in their business. Similarly, Myers et al. (2007) finds that five years of consecutive 
quarterly earnings increases could only be achieved through earnings management. Hadani et al. 
(2011) argue that earnings management adversely impacts financial reporting quality and increases 
information asymmetries between investors and managers. 
Empirically, extensive prior studies indicate that managers use various earnings 
manipulation strategies to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, significantly reducing overall 
financial reporting quality. Specifically, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence that 
managers manipulate both operating cash flow and working capital accruals to avoid earnings 
decreases and losses. Similarly, Das and Zhang (2003) find that managers use working capital 
accruals to round up earnings in order to meet analysts’ earnings expectations and report positive 
profits. DeFond and Park (1997) determine that if current earnings are good and expected future 
earnings are poor, managers also use income-decreasing accruals to build a “cookie jar” for beating 
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earnings benchmarks in the future. Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) extend DeFond and Park 
(1997) by demonstrating that managers smooth earnings depends upon the level of cash flow 
observed, and that managers over report for lower levels of observed cash flow and decrease the 
over reporting as the news gets better. Roychowdhury (2006) finds that firms also manipulate real 
activates (e.g., offering price discounts to temporarily increase sales, overproduction to reduce the 
cost of goods sold, and the reduction of discretionary expenditures to improve reported earnings) 
to meet or beat various earnings benchmarks. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) argue that unlike accrual-
based earnings management, real earnings management deviates from optimal business operations 
and will be detrimental to a firm’s future cash flow and long-term profitability. Further, Matsumoto 
(2002) finds that managers either manipulate earnings upward or guide analysts’ forecasts 
downward to beat or meet analysts’ earnings expectations. Similarly, Bartov et al. (2002) also 
finds that managers guide analysts’ forecasts downward in order to meet or beat analysts’ earnings 
expectations. Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills (2004) determine that managers lower their projected 
effective tax rates to meet various earnings benchmarks. 
Unlike equity markets, debt markets are largely dominated by institutional investors and 
credit rating agencies (Khurana and Raman, 2003). Approximately 95% of debt holders consist of 
institutional investors who are more sophisticated and able to access firm-specific information 
(Jiang, 2008). Similarly, credit agencies, excluded from the SEC’s Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(2001), have access to firms’ nonpublic information including minutes of board meetings, profit 
breakdowns by product, budget forecasts, detailed financials by product line or division, capital 
spending plans, new production plans, and internal capital allocation data (Ederington and Yawitz, 
1987; SEC, 2003; Jorion, Liu, and Shi, 2005). Given their ability to access more valuable 
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information regarding a firm’s prospects, debt holders and credit agencies are therefore more likely 
to recognize managers’ opportunistic behavior and ask for higher risk premium.  
 
2.3 Default Risk 
For firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks, problems will arise when a firm 
break its string. Investors might assume that there are potentially serious financial problems at the 
firm so that it cannot generate enough cash flow to consistently hit earnings benchmarks (Graham 
et al. 2005). Penman (2003) argues that equity holders’ earnings momentum investing behavior 
promotes stock price bubbles. Once this bubble bursts, there will be a dramatically large negative 
market response. Similarly, Agapova and Mailibayeva (2016) argue that investors overweigh 
string signals and under-weigh a firm’s actual performance. Thus, the break in string is likely to 
cause a substantial market response. Consistent with these arguments, prior studies find that 
breaking a string of earnings benchmarks is associated with decreases in expectations of future 
cash flows and a disproportionately large negative market response (Skinner and Sloan, 2002; 
Barth et al., 1999; Xie, 2010). In fact, Skinner and Sloan (2002) call this disproportionately large 
negative market response as earnings “torpedo” effects.  
It is well known that stock return and bond yield are positively correlated because the 
common movements in future expected returns (Fama and French 1989; Shiller and Beltrati, 1992; 
Campbell and Ammer, 1993). Therefore, like equity holders, debt holders also have incentive to 
avoid the break in string of earnings benchmarks. Moreover, Dichev (1998) find a negative relation 
between the probability of default risk and stock returns. Campbell et al. (2008) find that stock 
with low average returns have a high default risk even controlling for high loading on market, 
small-cap, and value risk factors. More importantly, Ke and Petroni (2004) find that institutional 
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investors are able to predict a break in a string of consecutive quarterly earnings increases thereby 
avoiding the economically significant negative stock response, because institutional investors are 
able to access more valuable information regarding a firm’s prospects. Since most debt holders are 
able to access firm-specific information (Jiang, 2008), they are more likely to ask for higher bond 
premium for the firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks in order to offset the potential 
default risks associated with the string break.  
Sustaining a string of earnings benchmark also draws regulator’ attention. The Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement division’s chief accountant, Charles Niemeier 
(2002), stated that one of the characteristics that the SEC used in identifying possible accounting 
irregularities was the pattern of narrowly meeting or beating analysts’ estimates and reporting 
consistent revenue increases (Bryan-Low, 2002). One such example is the case of General Electric 
(GE) which met or exceeded consensus analysts’ earnings expectations every quarter from 1995-
2004. This led the SEC in August of 2009 to allege that GE accelerated more than $370 million in 
revenue and made improper change to GE’s accounting for sales that increased GE’s 2002 net 
earnings by $585 million. Another example is the case of Cardinal Health which deceived investors 
by presenting a string of earnings increases from September 2000 through March 2004. This led 
the SEC in July of 2007 to allege that Cardinal materially overstated its operating revenue and 
earnings trends. Empirically, Chu et al. (2016) find that a large proportion of AAER firms have 
positive earnings strings by analyzing a sample of firms subject to SEC enforcement actions for 
manipulating earnings, suggesting that aggressive accounting plays a role in string formation. 
Therefore, firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks may also experience future litigation 
risk. Arena and Julio (2011) find that firms with greater exposure to litigation risk tend to cut back 
on capital expenditure and hold more cash in anticipation of future contingency. Fich and 
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Shivdasani (2007) find that firm’s lawsuit results in significant valuation and reputation losses. 
Yuan and Zhang (2015) find that creditors charge higher interest spreads on loan to borrowers with 
higher litigation risk, and that lawsuit increases the probability of debt covenant violation 
dramatically. Taking together, debt holders are more likely to view the firms that sustain a string 
of earnings benchmarks as high risk borrowers and ask for higher risk premium. 
 
2.4 Hypothesis Development 
Overall, from a static perspective, debt holders, just like equity holders, use earnings 
benchmarks to assess firm performance and beating earnings benchmarks lowers the cost of debt. 
However, from a cumulative perspective, sustaining a string of earnings benchmarks only 
maximizes equity holders’ value rather than debt holders’ value. In order to sustain a string of 
earnings benchmarks, managers may use various types of earnings manipulation strategies, which 
will significantly weaken firms’ creditworthiness and promote information asymmetry between 
bondholders and managers. More importantly, debt holders have to bear the potential litigation 
and default risk associated with aggressive accounting and breaking a string of earnings 
benchmarks.  
Unlike the equity market, the debt market is dominated by institutional investors (Khurana 
and Raman 2003). Jiang (2008) finds that approximately 95% of debt holders consist of 
institutional investors who are more sophisticated and able to access firm-specific information. 
Thus, given their ability to access more valuable information regarding a firm’s prospects, debt 
holders are more likely to recognize managers’ earnings manipulation strategies and are able to 
recognize the potential litigation risks and default risks associated with the break in the string of 
earnings benchmarks. In the debt market, the bond yield spread (the difference between the 
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corporate bond yield and issuance and the Treasury bond yield with comparable maturity) 
represents the risk premium that firms must pay to borrow money in the debt market (Sengupta, 
1998; Shi, 2003; Jiang, 2008). If debt holders view firms that sustain a string of earnings 
benchmarks as risky borrowers, then I expect debt holders will ask for higher yield spreads. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that the length of a string of earnings benchmarks is positively associated 
with bond yield spread. 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the length of a string of earnings benchmarks is positively 
associated with bond yield spread. 
 
Credit rating reflects a rating agency’s overall opinion as of a specific date regarding the 
creditworthiness of a borrower. Credit ratings have become increasingly more important in the 
debt market as it is viewed as an efficient credit quality benchmark (Frost, 2007). Hand, 
Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) and Kliger and Sarig (2000) confirm that credit ratings are able 
to explain the difference in bond yields. More importantly, several prior studies find that credit 
rating agencies review borrowers’ creditworthiness based on both public and non-public 
information. Public information includes financial ratios, such as leverage, profitability ratios, and 
other information associated with financial statements (Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979; Ashbaugh-
Skaife, Collins, and LaFond, 2006). Credit rating agencies also have access to firms’ non-public 
information including minutes of board meetings, profit breakdown by product, budget forecasts, 
detailed financials by product line or division, capital spending plans, new production plans, and 
internal capital allocation data (Ederington and Yawitz, 1987; SEC, 2003; Jorion et al., 2005). The 
SEC also views credit agencies’ private information gathering processes as necessary and valuable 
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for investors. Thus, credit rating agencies have been excluded from the SEC’s Regulation Fair 
Disclosure. Given their access to more private information regarding a firm’s financial reporting 
quality, credit rating agencies are more likely to recognize managers’ opportunistic behavior and 
the potential costs of sustaining a string of earnings benchmarks. I hypothesize that the length of a 
string of earnings benchmarks is associated with a lower credit rating. 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the length of a string of earnings benchmarks is associated 
with lower credit ratings. 
 
However, there are several reasons why the results may not support my hypotheses. First, 
prior studies question the sophistication of debt holders. For example, Bhojraj and Swaminathan 
(2009) find that the debt market misprices discretionary accruals similar to the equity market 
suggesting that debt holders may not be able to identify borrowers’ opportunistic behaviors. 
Second, prior studies also question the motivation of using earnings benchmarks in pricing bonds 
and assigning credit ratings. Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) find that rating changes tend to occur 
after abnormal stock returns. Plummer and Tse (1999) confirm that earnings change is less closely 
associated with bond returns as bond ratings improve. Also, with access to more private 
information, debt holders and credit agencies may not entirely rely on earnings benchmarks to 
access a borrower’s performance (Jiang, 2008). Third, debt holders and credit agencies may react 
to different earnings benchmarks differently. Jiang (2008) argues that beating last year’s earnings 
indicates earnings growth, while beating analysts’ earnings expectations indicates superior 
performance relative to third parties’ (analysts) expectations. Thus, the latter benchmark may be 
less informative to both bondholders and credit agencies. Fourth, debt holders may react positively 
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to firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks since Datta and Dhillon (1993) find that debt 
holders appear to react positively to unexpected earnings increases. Fifth, unlike debt holders, 
credit agencies have less agency problems as they are outsiders. Thus, sustaining a string of 
earnings benchmarks may be less informative to credit rating agencies relative to the debt holders. 
Finally, debt holders might pay more attention on earnings string rather than MBE string since 
debt covenants are known to focus on actual earnings number but less likely to care about analysts’ 
forecasts.  
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ESSAY 1 CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 The New Bond Issue and Credit Rating Sample 
I collect non-convertible and fixed rate bonds issued by U.S. public firms for the periods 
reported from 1972-2016 from Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) Global New 
Issues database. I exclude bonds with asset-backed or credit enhancement features as the value of 
collateral rather than a firm’s creditworthiness may significantly affect a firm’s spread (Campbell 
and Taksler, 2003). In addition, following Khurana and Raman (2003), for firms with multiple 
issuances in a given year, I include only those observations with the largest offering amount. 
Further, I collect the level of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) rating for the periods reported from 
1972-2016 from the SDC. I transform S&P ratings into a 22-point scale. Table 1 reports the 
distribution of observations across the rating categories. The total credit rating observations consist 
of 15,549 firm-quarter observations from 1972-2016. 
 
3.2 Earnings String Construction 
I calculate a firm’s earnings string variable and collect accounting data by using the 
COMPUSTAT quarterly database for the periods reported from 1972-2016. More specifically, I 
define an earnings string as a sequence of quarters in which a firm’s earnings before income tax 
(EBIT) is higher than that of the same fiscal quarter from the previous year. Unlike prior studies 
using a firm’s earnings per share (EPS) to construct an earnings string variable (Myers et al., 2007), 
my study uses EBIT as basic EPS does not take into account any stock dilutive effects on EPS. 
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The total earnings string observations consist of 19,266 firm-quarter observations from 1972-2016. 
In later regression analyses, I require each string to have no missing value for all of the control 
variables. 
 
3.3 MBE String Construction  
I use the I/B/E/S Analyst Summary database for the periods reported from 1972-2016 to 
construct the MBE string variable. Specifically, I define a MBE string as a sequence of quarters in 
which a firm’s actual earnings meet or beat analysts’ most recent consensus forecasts before the 
earnings quarterly announcement date. The total MBE string observations consist of 19,266 firm-
quarter observations from 1972-2016. After merging the I/B/E/S data with the COMPUSTAT 
quarterly data, the CRSP daily stock returns data, and the SDC new bond issue and credit rating 
data, and dropping all the missing values, my final sample consists of 5,894 firm-quarter 
observation. Table 2 summarizes the sample selection process. 
 
3.4 Model Specification 
I use the length of earnings string (ES_String) and MBE string (MBE_String) for the 
proxies of the earnings benchmark string. To test H1, I use the following regression model to 
examine the association between the bond yield spread and the length of the earnings benchmark 
string: 
Spreadiq = α0 + α1ES_Stringiq /MBE_Stringiq + α2Sizeiq + α3Lossiq + α4StdRetiq + α5Tobin’s Qiq  
              + α6Leviq + α7CFOiq + α8Liqiq+ α9Tangiq + α10ROAiq + α11IssueSizeiq + (α12Dacci  
                    + α13Ab_Dexpiq + α14Ab_Prodiq) + ∑αtYeariq + ∑αtIndustryiq + εiq   (1) 
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Where: 
Spread = the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond firm it issued in 
year t minus the Treasury bond yield with similar maturity. I also measure spread 
as the natural logarithm of the initial bond spread. 
ES_String = the natural logarithm of the length of the earnings string measured by a sequence 
of quarters in which a firm’s EBIT is higher than that of the same fiscal quarter 
from the previous year. 
MBE_String = the natural logarithm of the length of the MBE string measured by a sequence of 
quarters in which a firm’s actual earnings meet or beat analysts’ most recent 
consensus forecasts before the earnings quarterly announcement date. 
Size = the natural logarithm of firm i’s total assets at the end of quarter q. 
Loss =equal to one if there is a loss in the current fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
StdRet = the standard deviation of firm i’s daily stock returns during quarter q. 
Tobin’s Q =firm i’s market value of assets/the book value of assets at the end of quarter q. 
Lev =firm i’s total debt/total assets at the end of quarter q. 
CFO =firm i’s operating cash flow/total assets at the end of quarter q. 
Liq = the ratio of new liquid assets (total current assets – total current liabilities) to 
total assets at the end of quarter q. 
Tang =the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment over total assets at the end of 
quarter q. 
ROA =firm i’s return on assets at the end of year t measured by income before 
extraordinary items scaled by average total assets (quarter q-1 and 1). 
IssueSize =the natural logarithm of the offering amount of the bond (in millions of dollars). 
Dacc = firm i’s quarterly discretionary accruals measured by a modified Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) cash flow accrual model.3 
                                                 
3 The Dechow and Dichev (2002) cash flow accrual model regresses working capital accruals on operating cash flows 
in the prior, current, and future periods. The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model improved the traditional Jones model 
by explicitly mapping cash flows into the accruals generating process, which, I believe, is particularly important in 
the debt market. Further, as suggested by McNichols (2002), I also include the change in sales revenue and a fourth 
quarter indicator variable into the model in order to increase explanatory power. Specifically, I estimate discretionary 
accruals by regressing the following model for each industry group: ∆WCt=b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2CFOt + b3CFOt+1 
+∆Sale/salet-1 +Q4 + ε (2). 
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Ab_Dexp = firms i’s quarterly abnormal expenditures measured by Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
real earnings management model. 
Ab_Prod = firms i’s quarterly abnormal production measured by Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
real earnings management model. 
 
If debt holders view firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks as risky borrowers, 
then I expect that the coefficient on ES_Stringiq/MBE_Stringiq will be significantly positive, 
suggesting that debt holders demand a higher risk premiums from firms that sustain a string of 
earnings benchmarks. To test H2, I use the following regression model to examine the association 
between the credit rating and the length of the earnings benchmark string: 
 
SP_Ratingiq = α0 + α1ES_Stringiq /MBE_Stringiq + α2Sizeiq + α3Lossiq+ α3StdRetiq + α4Tobin’s Qiq 
+ α5Leviq + α6CFOiq + α7Liqiq+ α8Tangiq + α9ROAiq + α10IssueSizeiq + (α11Dacciq 
+ α12Ab_Dexpiq+ α13Ab_Prodiq) + ∑αtYeariq + ∑αtIndustryiq + εiq  (3) 
 
Where: SP_Ratingiq is the firm’s S&P ratings from AAA (indicating a string capacity to 
pay interest and repay principal) to D (indicating actual default). I transform S&P ratings into a 
22-point scale with a smaller number indicating a better rating. Table 1 provides a detailed rating-
scale index. Consistent with Jiang (2008), the BBB rating-scale has the largest observations.4 If 
credit rating agencies also view firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks as risky 
borrowers, then I expect the coefficient on ES_ /MBE_Stringiq will be significantly positive.  
Further, to examine whether the debt market reacts differently from the equity market to 
firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks, I also use the following regression model to 
                                                 
4 Jiang (2008) classify the bonds rated as BBB or below in the high default risk subsample and bonds rated as BBB+ 
and above in to the low default risk subsample. 
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examine the association between firms’ abnormal stock returns and the length of the earnings 
benchmark string: 
 
CAR (-1, 1)iq/ BHAR (-1, 1)iq = α0 + α1ES_Stringiq /MBE_Stringiq + α2Sizeiq + α3Lossiq  
                                               + α4Tobin’s Qiq+ α5Leviq + α6CFOiq + α7Liqiq+ α8Tangiq + α9ROAi 
                                                                      + α10IssueSizeiq + (α11Dacciq + α12Ab_Dexpiq + α13Ab_Prodiq)  
                                               + ∑αtYeariq + ∑αtIndustryiq + εiq   (4) 
 
Where: CAR (-1, 1)iq is firm i’s cumulative abnormal returns measured over three days (-
1, +1) around the quarterly earnings announcement date. The abnormal returns are obtained from 
a Carhart (1997) four-factor model with the CRSP value-weighted index return as the market 
returns.5 The parameters of the model are estimated over the period day -300 to day -60. In addition, 
I also use buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) as an alternative proxy as it can effectively 
avoid a rebalancing bias in the monthly reference index returns (Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 1999). 
BHAR (-1, 1)iq is firm i’s buy-and-hold abnormal returns measured over three days (-1, +1) around 
the quarterly earnings announcement date. The abnormal returns are also obtained from a Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model with the CRSP value-weighted index return as the market return. If the 
equity market rewards firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks, then I expect the 
coefficient on ES_Stringiq/MBE_Stringiq will be significantly positive. 
                                                 
5 The Carhart (1997) four-factor model extend Fama-French (1989) three-factor model by including a momentum 
factor. The momentum is estimated by subtracting the equally-weighted average of the lowest performing firms from 
the equally-weighted average of the highest performing firm, lagged one month. 
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3.5 Control Variables 
I control for firm characteristics that could influence the bond yield spread or credit rating 
by including a firm’s size (Sizeiq), profitability (Lossiq), equity volatility (StdRetiq), operating cash 
flow (CFOiq), liquidity (Liqiq), tangibility (Tangiq), leverage (Leviq), and return on assets (ROAiq). 
Specifically, Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) find that smaller firms and firms with a 
lower operating cash flow have a higher default risk. As such, I expect Sizeiq and CFOiq to be 
negatively associated with Spread/SP_Rating. Graham et al. (2008) suggest that profitable firms 
generally have a lower default risk and borrow at a lower cost. Thus, I expect Lossiq to be positively 
associated with Spreadiq/SP_Ratingiq. Campbell and Taksler (2003) find that a rising idiosyncratic 
equity risk increases the probability of default resulting in higher yields on corporate bonds relative 
to Treasury bonds. I use firm i’s quarterly standard deviation to measure equity volatility and 
expect that StdRetiq is positively associated with Spreadiq/SP_Ratingiq. Chen, Lesmond, and Wei 
(2007) determine that higher liquidity earnings increase overall default risk. Thus, I expect Liqiq is 
positively associated with Spreadiq/SP_Ratingiq. Graham et al. (2008) argue that lenders may 
recover tangible assets when borrowers default. As a consequence, firms with more tangible assets 
have lower borrowing costs. Thus, I expect Tangiq to be negatively associated with 
Spreadiq/SP_Ratingiq. Graham et al. (2008) also find that firms with a higher leverage ratio have a 
greater default risk. As such, I expect Leviq to be positively associated with Spreadiq/SP_Ratingiq. 
Finally, Ziebart and Reiter (1992) find that a high return on assets is associated with a low bond 
yield and a high bond rating. Thus, I expect ROAiq to be negatively associated with 
Spreadiq/SP_Ratingiq. 
I also control for firms’ future investment opportunities and bond features that could 
influence the bond yields spread or credit rating by including a firms’ Tobin’s Q (Tobin’s Qiq) and 
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bond issue size (IssueSizeiq). A higher Tobin’s q could be explained by higher future growth 
opportunities (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Thus, I expect Tobin’s Qiq to be negatively associated 
with Spreadiq/SP_Ratingiq. Further, Sengupta (1998) argues that a bond’s issue size reflects a 
bond’s liquidity (i.e., larger issue size, higher liquidity), which is negatively associated with the 
yield spread. However, Shi (2003) suggests that a bond issue’s size reflects a firm’s overall debt 
burden, which is positively associated with the bond yield spread. Therefore, I have no prediction 
regarding IssueSizeiq. 
Further, I control for the earnings management proxies that could influence the bond yield 
spread or credit rating by including firms’ discretionary accruals (Dacciq), abnormal expenditures 
(Ab_Dexpiq), and abnormal production (Ab_Prodiq). Francis et al. (2005) find that poor accounting 
quality measured by accrual quality is associated with larger costs of debt. Ge and Kim (2014) 
confirm that credit rating agencies and debt holders perceive real earnings management as a credit 
risk increasing factor and, as such, require higher risk premiums. Thus, I expect that Dacciq, 
Ab_Dexpiq, and Ab_Prodiq are positively associated with Spreadiq/SP_Ratingiq. More importantly, 
as mentioned in Chapter 2, sustaining a string of earnings benchmarks may cause agency issues. 
Therefore, I expect that the association between ES_Stringiq/MBE_stringiq and 
Spreadiq/SP_Ratingiq is still significantly positive even after controlling for firms’ economic 
conditions and earnings management proxies (e.g., Dacciq, Ab_Dexpiq, and Ab_Prodiq). Finally, I 
include year and industry dummy variables (based on the two-digit SIC code) to control for the 
fixed effects of year and industry on Spreadiq/SP_Ratingiq. 
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Table 1. The Transformation of S&P Ratings Letters and Sample Observation Distribution 
S&P Credit 
Rating Letter  
S&P Rating 
Variable  Observations  Percentage 
AA  1  316  2.03% 
AA+  2  136  0.87% 
AA  3  847  5.45% 
AA-  4  951  6.12% 
A+  5  1437  9.24% 
A  6  2443  15.71% 
A-  7  1507  9.69% 
BBB+  8  1413  9.09% 
BBB  9  1803  11.60% 
BBB-  10  1140  7.33% 
BB+  11  422  2.71% 
BB  12  482  3.10% 
BB-  13  547  3.52% 
B+  14  623  4.01% 
B  15  688  4.42% 
B-  16  582  3.74% 
CCC+  17  147  0.95% 
CCC  18  60  0.39% 
CCC-  19  4  0.03% 
CC  20  1  0.01% 
C  21  0  0.00% 
D  22  0  0.00% 
The sample consists of 15,549 firm quarter observation from 1972 to 2016 
 
Table 2. Sample Determination 
Total number of observations collected from the SDC Bond Issues database (1972-2016) 24,626 
   Less missing value after merging with the COMPUSTAT quarterly file and the CRSP 
daily file (2,069) 
 22,557 
   Less missing value to calculate earnings/MBE string (3,291) 
 19,266 
   Less missing value to calculate control variables (13,401) 
Final sample for regression analysis 5,865 
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ESSAY 1 CHAPTER FOUR: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
4.1 Earnings String/MBE String Distribution 
Table 3, Panel A reports the observation distribution across the earnings strings. Overall, 
the proportion of the observations tends to decrease with the length of the earnings string. Nine 
thousand three hundred fifty-four firm-quarter observations (48.55% of the sample) report a string 
of 1-8 quarters, 2,077 firm-quarter observations (10.78% of the sample) report a string of 9-16 
quarters, 621 firm-quarter observations (3.22% of the sample) report a string of 17-24 quarters, 78 
firm-quarter observations (0.4% of the sample) report a string of 25-32 quarters, and 43 firm-
quarter observations (0.22% of the sample) report a string of 33-40 quarters. The firm-quarter 
observations with a string above 40 quarters are only 0.43% of the sample. 
Table 3, Panel B reports the observation distribution across the MBE strings. Similarly, the 
proportion of the observations tends to decrease with the length of the MBE string. Ten thousand 
one hundred two firm-quarter observations (52.43% of the sample) report a string of 1-8 quarters, 
2,358 firm-quarter observations (12.24% of the sample) report a string of 9-16 quarters, 476 firm-
quarter observations (2.47% of the sample) report a string of 17-24 quarters, 107 firm-quarter 
observations (0.56% of the sample) report a string of 25-32 quarters, and 42 firm-quarter 
observations (0.22% of the sample) report a string of 33-40 quarters. The firm-quarter observations 
with a string above 40 quarters are only 0.13% of the sample. 
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4.2 Univariate Analysis 
From a cross-sectional prospective, Jiang (2008) finds that firms that meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks (e.g., earnings from last year and analysts’ earnings expectations) have a lower cost 
of debt measured by the bond yield spread and credit rating relative to firms that fail to meet or 
beat earnings benchmarks.6 This result may be contrary to my hypotheses. To better understand 
the relation between the earnings string/MBE string and the bond yield spread/credit rating, I plot 
the mean of the spread/credit ratings and six quantiles of earnings strings with a range from 0-40 
quarters7. As Figure 1, Panel A illustrates, there is a curvilinear relationship between the bond 
yield spread and the length of the earnings string. Consistent with Jiang (2008), approximately, 
firms with less than 16 quarters of earnings string have a lower yield spread relative to firms with 
no earnings string. However, consistent with my hypothesis, Figure 1, Panel A also indicates that 
the mean yield spread increases as the length of the earnings string increases after an earnings 
string reaches eight quarters. Figure 1, Panel B plots the mean yield spread and six quantiles of the 
MBE string. Similarly, firms with less than 16 quarters of MBE string have a lower yield spread 
relative to firms with no MBE string. However, the mean yield spread increases as the length of 
the MBE string increases after an MBE string reaches eight quarters. 
Figure 1, Panel C plots the mean credit rating and six quantiles of the earnings string. The 
firms with less than 16 quarters of earnings string have a lower credit rating relative to firms with 
no earnings string. However, I do not observe a significantly increasing trend after an earnings 
string reaches eight quarters. Figure 1, Panel D plots the mean credit rating and six quantiles of 
                                                 
6 Jiang (2008) uses annual data rather than quarterly data. 
7 Since there are very limited firm-quarter observations with earning strings/MBE strings over 40 quarters, I keep only 
those observations with earnings strings/MBE strings less than and equal to 40 for Figure 1. Quantile 0 represents the 
firm-quarter observations with no earnings string. In addition to Quantile 0, each quantile represents eight quarters of 
earnings string (e.g., Quantile 1 represents the length of the earnings string with range from one to eight). 
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the MBE string. Consistent with my prior findings, firms with less than 16 quarters of MBE string 
have a lower credit rating relative to firms with no MBE string. However, the mean credit rating 
increases as the length of the MBE string increases after an MBE string reaches eight quarters. 
Next, I exclude firms with earnings strings/MBE strings that are less than eight quarters 
and re-divide the earnings strings/MBE strings into five quantiles. Table 4, Panel A reports the 
univariate test of spread difference across those five quantiles of earning strings. The results from 
the Wilcoxon test indicate that the mean spread is significantly higher in the higher quantile of 
earnings string (e.g., Quantile4, p <.0001 and Quantile5, p <.0001). These results provide 
preliminary evidence suggesting that longer earnings string firms have a higher bond yield spread. 
However, I did not find the mean credit rating to be lower in the higher quantile of earnings string. 
Table 4, Panel B reports the mean spread and credit rating across those five quantiles of the MBE 
string. The results from Wilcoxon test indicate that the mean spread is significantly higher in the 
highest quantile of the MBE string (p<.0001). In addition, Table 4, Panel B also indicates that the 
mean credit rating scale is significantly higher in the higher quantile of the MBE string (e.g., 
Quantile4, p=0.06 and Quantile5, p=0.007). Overall, the results from Table 4 provide preliminary 
evidence that the longer earnings string/MBE string firms have a higher bond yield spread and a 
lower credit rating. 
Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics for the full sample. The mean yield spread 
equals 5% and the average credit rating is BBB+. The mean length of the earnings string is 
approximately four quarters, and the mean length of the MBE string is also approximately four 
quarters. Firm size, the natural log of total assets (in millions), has a mean of about 10.45. 
Approximately, 24% of firms report losses. The mean Tobin’s Q score is 1.4 (Q>1) suggesting 
that the sample firms have relatively higher growth opportunities. The mean value of leverage 
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indicates that the total debt ratio is 78%. The mean cash flow is 3% of total assets. The mean value 
of tangible assets is 23% of total assets. The mean value of liquidity is 7% of total assets. The 
mean value of the return on assets is 0.7% of total assets. The mean offering amount is US$100 
million. 
Table 3. Panel A: Earnings String Distribution 
Length of Earnings Strings 
Number of  
Observations 
Number of  
Firms 
Percent of 
Observations 
Percent of  
firms 
0 quarters 7,009 1,550 36.38% 23.33% 
1-8 quarters 9,354 3,930 48.55% 59.16% 
9-16 quarters 2,077 765 10.78% 11.52% 
17-24 quarters 621 224 3.22% 3.37% 
25-32 quarters 78 69 0.40% 1.04% 
33-40 quarters 43 36 0.22% 0.54% 
41-48 quarters  26 21 0.13% 0.32% 
49-56 quarters 16 14 0.08% 0.21% 
57-64 quarters 7 7 0.04% 0.11% 
65-72 quarters 13 10 0.07% 0.15% 
73-80 quarters 14 9 0.07% 0.14% 
80 or more quarters 8 8 0.04% 0.12% 
     
Total 19266 6643 100% 100% 
Panel B: MBE String Distribution 
 
Length of MBE Strings 
Number of 
Observations 
Number of  
Firms 
Percent of 
Observations 
Percent of  
Firms 
0 quarters 6,156 1,496 31.95% 22.41% 
1-8 quarters 10,102 3,957 52.43% 59.28% 
9-16 quarters 2,358 798 12.24% 11.96% 
17-24 quarters 476 268 2.47% 4.01% 
25-32 quarters 107 94 0.56% 1.41% 
33-40 quarters 42 39 0.22% 0.58% 
41-48 quarters  20 18 0.10% 0.27% 
49 or more quarters 5 5 0.03% 0.07% 
     
Total 19266 6675 100% 100% 
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Panels A and B plot the mean yield spread and six quantiles of the earnings string/MBE string with a range from 0-
40 quarters. Panels C and D plot the mean credit rating and six quantiles of the earnings string/MBE string with range 
from 0-40 quarters. Quantile 0 represents firm-quarter observations with no earnings string. In addition to Quantile 
0, each quantile represents eight quarters of earnings strings (e.g., Quantile 1 representing the length of earnings 
string with range from one to eight).  
Panel Panel 
Panel A Panel 
Figure 1. Comparison of Yield Spread/S&P Rating with Earnings/MBE String 
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Table 4. Univariate Tests of Differences: Higher vs. lower quantile of earnings string/MBE string 
 
Panel B: 
MBE String 
Quantile1  
MBE String 
Quantile2  
MBE String 
Quantile3  
MBE String 
Quantile4  
MBE String 
Quantile5 
Variables  Mean N   Mean N   Mean N   Mean N   Mean N 
Spread 118.63 529  121.28 816  119.66 659  111.47 883  151.36 650 
    (0.41)  (0.36)  (0.14)  (<.0001)*** 
S&P Rating 7.49 275  7.47 402  7.71 283  7.88 347  7.91 464 
    (0.37)  (0.20)  (0.06)*  (0.007)*** 
 
*, **, and *** indicates Wilcoxon test significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 
Earnings String 
Quantile1  
Earnings String 
Quantile2  
Earnings String 
Quantile3  
Earnings String 
Quantile4  
Earnings String 
Quantile5 
Variables  Mean N   Mean N   Mean N   Mean N   Mean N 
Spread 107.73 749  111.60 322  99.45 672  116.64 616  125.76 544 
    (0.04)**  (0.39)  (<.0001)***  (<.0001)*** 
S&P Rating 7.71 384  7.52 146  7.30 293  7.16 286  6.24 334 
    (0.20)  (0.04)**  (0.03)**  (<.0001)*** 
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
Lower 
Quartile 
Upper 
Quartile 
Spread 4.766 0.880 4.248 5.318 
SP_Rating 8.221 3.793 6.000 10.000 
ES_String 3.921 6.626 0.000 5.000 
MBE_String 3.885 5.438 0.000 5.000 
Size 10.451 2.380 8.514 12.769 
Loss 0.238 0.426 0.000 0.000 
StdRet 0.064 1.636 -0.867 1.021 
Tobin's Q 1.400 0.641 1.046 1.488 
Lev 0.787 0.189 0.625 0.960 
CFO 0.031 0.054 0.005 0.055 
Liq 0.071 0.128 -0.017 0.142 
Tang 0.235 0.288 0.000 0.441 
ROA 0.007 0.012 0.002 0.011 
IssueSize 99.765 1.044 99.717 100.000 
Dacc 0.000 0.029 -0.016 0.015 
Ab_Dexp 0.030 0.053 0.000 0.051 
Ab_Prod 0.002 0.047 -0.021 0.017 
 
All variables are defined as in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.   
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ESSAY 1 CHAPTER FIVE: MAIN RESULTS 
 
I estimate Models (1), (3), and (4) using ordinary least squares (OLS). In order to control 
for the potential heteroskedasticity, all reported t-statistics are measured by robust standard errors 
(White, 1980). I also cluster standard errors by year and firm to address concerns about serial 
correlation of residuals in the data (Petersen, 2009; Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2010). 
 
5.1 Earnings String Models 
Table 6 reports the results of Model (1) using ES_String as the variable of interest. 
Specifically, Column (1) reports the results of Model (1) by excluding earnings management 
proxies. Column (2) presents the results of Model (1) by including only an accrual-based earnings 
management proxy. Column (3) provides the results of Model (1) employing both accrual-based 
and real earnings management proxies. Consistent with H1, the results in Column (1) indicate that 
the length of the earning string is positively associated with the yield spread (p<.0001), suggesting 
that debt holders view firms with longer earnings strings as risky borrowers and, as such, ask for 
higher risk premiums. Further, the results in Columns (2) and (3) demonstrate that the positive 
relation between the length of the earnings string and the yield spread still hold after controlling 
for earnings management proxies. It is worth noting that the coefficients on ES_String are smaller 
in Columns (2) and (3) after controlling for earnings management proxies. These results indicate 
that the positive relation between the length of an earning string and the yield spread is not entirely 
attributable to managers’ opportunistic behaviors.  In terms of economic significance, I find that 
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the yield spread increases approximately 2% (Exp0.0194-1) for every one consecutive quarter 
increase in a firm’s earnings string. 
Table 7 reports the results of Model (3) using ES_String as the variable of interest. 
Similarly, Column (1) reports the results of Model (3) by excluding earnings management proxies. 
Columns (2) and (3) present the results of Model (3) by including earnings management proxies. 
Consistent with H2, the results in Column (1) indicate that the length of the earnings string is 
associated with a lower credit rating (p<.0001) suggesting that credit agencies also view firms that 
sustain an earnings string as risky borrowers. The results in Columns (2) and (3) demonstrate that 
the relation between the length of the earnings string and the credit rating still hold, but with 
smaller coefficients. These results also suggest that the positive relation between the length of an 
earning string and credit rating is not entirely attributable to managers’ opportunistic behaviors.  
Table 8 reports the results of Model (4) using ES_String as the variable of interest. The 
results in Columns (1)-(3) indicate that three-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal returns are 
positively associated with the length of earnings strings even controlling for earnings management 
proxies (p<.0001). The results in Columns (4)-(6) demonstrate that three-day (-1, +1) buy-hold 
abnormal returns are also positively associated with the length of earnings strings even controlling 
for earnings management proxies (p<.0001). Consistent with prior studies (Barth et al., 1999; 
Myers, et al. 2007), these results suggest that the equity market rewards firms that sustain an 
earnings string. Overall, Tables 6-8 imply that the equity market rewards firms that sustain an 
earnings string, while the debt market actually punishes firms that sustain an earnings string. 
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5.2 MBE String Models 
Table 9 reports the results of Model (1) using MBE_String as the variable of interest. 
Specifically, Column (1) reports the results of Model (1) by excluding earnings management 
proxies. Column (2) provides the results of Model (1) by including only an accrual-based earnings 
management proxy. Column (3) presents the results of Model (1) by including both accrual-based 
and real earnings management proxies. Inconsistent with H1, the results in Table 9 indicate that 
the length of the MBE string is not associated with the yield spread. These results may be 
attributable to the fact that in contrast to the equity market, where meeting or beating analysts’ 
earnings expectations has been cited as the most important earnings benchmark (Brown and Caylor, 
2005), meeting or beating analysts’ earnings expectations is less informative to debt holders (Jiang, 
2008). 
Table 10 reports the results of Model (3) using MBE_String as the variable of interest. 
Column (1) reports the results of Model (3) by excluding earnings management proxies. Columns 
(2) and (3) present the results of Model (3) by including earnings management proxies. Consistent 
with H2, the results in Column (1) indicate that the length of the earnings string is associated with 
a lower credit rating (p<.0001) suggesting that credit agencies view firms that sustain an MBE 
string as risky borrowers. Further, the results in Columns (2) and (3) demonstrate that the length 
of the MBE string is associated with lower credit ratings even after controlling for earnings 
management proxies. 
Table 11 reports the results of Model (4) using MBE_String as the variable of interest. The 
results in Columns (1)-(3) indicate that three-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal returns are 
positively associated with the length of the MBE string even after controlling for earnings 
management proxies. The results in Columns (4)-(6) demonstrate that three-day (-1, +1) buy-hold 
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abnormal returns are also positively associated with the length of the earnings string even after 
controlling for earnings management proxies. Consistent with prior studies (Kasnik and 
McNichols, 2002; Bartov et al., 2002), these results suggest that the equity market rewards firms 
that sustain an MBE string. Overall, Tables 9-11 suggest that credit agencies react differently from 
equity holders to firms that sustain an MBE string.   
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Table 6. Regression of Bond Yield Spread on the Length of Earnings String 
Spreadiq = α0 + α1ES_Stringiq + α2Sizeiq + α3Lossiq + α4StdRetiq + α5Tobin’s Qiq + α6Le 
  + α7CFOiq + α8Liqiq + α9Tangiq + α10ROAiq + α11IssueSizeiq + (α12Dacci  
  + α13Ab_Dexpiq + α14Ab_Prodiq) + ∑αtYeariq + ∑αtIndustryiq + εiq 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Spread Spread 
ES_String 0.0275*** 0.0245** 0.0194* 
 (2.84) (1.95) (1.49) 
Size -0.2528*** -0.2752*** -0.2726*** 
 (-21.18) (-20.11) (-18.75) 
Loss 0.2097*** 0.2152*** 0.2288*** 
 (6.24) (4.88) (4.85) 
StdRet 0.0063** 0.0037 0.0014 
 (1.76) (0.87) (0.29) 
Tobin’s Q -0.3030*** -0.3152*** -0.2937*** 
 (-13.66) (-10.13) (-8.48) 
Lev 1.1123*** 0.9780*** 0.9591*** 
 (12.81) (9.08) (8.24) 
CFO -0.2150 0.0046 0.0515 
 (-1.26) (0.02) (0.20) 
Liq 0.6040*** 0.4419*** 0.4273*** 
 (4.81) (3.00) (2.82) 
Tang 0.0487 0.0256 -0.0107 
 (0.52) (0.19) (-0.07) 
ROA -3.4428*** -3.1878*** -2.8644*** 
 (-3.69) (-2.74) (-2.32) 
IssueSize -1.1767*** -1.3797*** -1.0159* 
 (-2.50) (-2.12) (-1.61) 
Dacc  -0.9179* -0.6657 
  (-1.44) (-0.99) 
Ab_Dexp   -0.1241 
   (-0.27) 
Ab_Prod   0.5465 
   (1.26) 
Year Fixed Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Included Included Included 
N 5853 3346 2773 
R2 0.674 0.708 0.708 
 
Table 6 reports OLS regression results. The variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based 
on standard errors clustered within the firm. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the significance of parameter 
estimates at the 1, 5, and 10 % (one-sided) significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered within 
acquirer firms.  
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Table 7. Regression of Credit Rating on the Length of Earnings String 
SP_Ratingiq = α0 + α1ES_Stringiq + α2Sizeiq + α3Lossiq + α4StdRetiq + α5Tobin’s Qiq  
  + α6Lev + α7CFOiq + α8Liqiq + α9Tangiq + α10ROAiq + α11IssueSizeiq  
  + (α12Dacci + α13Ab_Dexpiq + α14Ab_Prodiq) + ∑αtYeariq + ∑αtIndustryiq  
   + εiq 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 SP_Rating SP_Rating SP_Rating 
ES_String 0.2412*** 0.2324*** 0.1844*** 
 (4.96) (3.46) (2.81) 
Size -1.2548*** -1.3620*** -1.3134*** 
 (-19.09) (-16.55) (-15.57) 
Loss 0.5891*** 0.6967*** 0.8662*** 
 (3.58) (3.39) (3.90) 
StdRet 0.0277** 0.0148 0.0114 
 (1.66) (0.75) (0.51) 
Tobin’s Q -1.2609*** -1.3953*** -1.2283*** 
 (-12.14) (-9.46) (-8.05) 
Lev 6.3087*** 6.0014*** 5.9232*** 
 (13.37) (10.22) (9.06) 
CFO -4.0819*** -2.5425*** -2.3187*** 
 (-5.95) (-3.09) (-2.73) 
Liq 2.4444*** 1.2663* 1.4756* 
 (3.27) (1.28) (1.51) 
Tang -0.2644 0.1275 0.0731 
 (-0.56) (0.18) (0.09) 
ROA -26.4505*** -19.7784*** -15.6939*** 
 (-6.02) (-3.64) (-2.60) 
IssueSize -4.2388** -0.9782 -0.0131 
 (-1.81) (-0.30) (-0.00) 
Dacc  0.5158 -0.1109 
  (0.23) (-0.04) 
Ab_Dexp   1.9255 
   (1.09) 
Ab_Prod   3.4984* 
   (1.60) 
Year Fixed Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Included Included Included 
N 5813 3324 2754 
R2 0.699 0.759 0.753 
Table 7 reports OLS regression results. The variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based 
on standard errors clustered within the firm. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the significance of parameter 
estimates at the 1, 5, and 10 % (one-sided) significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered within 
acquirer firms.  
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Table 8. Regression Equity Market Response on the Length of Earnings 
CAR (-1, 1)iq/ BHAR (-1, 1)iq = α0 + α1ES_Stringiq + α2Sizeiq + α3Lossiq + α4Tobin’s Qiq + α5Lev + α6CFOiq+ α7Liqiq + α8Tangiq   
                                               + α9ROAiq + α10IssueSizeiq + (α11Dacci + α12Ab_Dexpiq + α13Ab_Prodiq) + ∑αtYeariq + ∑αtIndustryiq  
                                                                      + εiq 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) BHAR(-1,1) BHAR(-1,1) BHAR(-1,1) 
ES_String 0.0046*** 0.0042*** 0.0040*** 0.0046*** 0.0041*** 0.0039*** 
 (5.38) (3.82) (3.42) (5.33) (3.75) (3.40) 
Size -0.0014** -0.0012* -0.0008 -0.0014** -0.0012* -0.0008 
 (-2.04) (-1.31) (-0.77) (-2.00) (-1.29) (-0.75) 
Loss -0.0040 -0.0039 -0.0064* -0.0040 -0.0040 -0.0066* 
 (-1.25) (-0.90) (-1.37) (-1.25) (-0.92) (-1.40) 
Tobin’s q -0.0051*** -0.0074*** -0.0082*** -0.0051*** -0.0074*** -0.0084*** 
 (-3.76) (-4.97) (-4.79) (-3.68) (-4.96) (-4.81) 
Lev 0.0163*** 0.0238*** 0.0262*** 0.0168*** 0.0243*** 0.0267*** 
 (2.69) (2.86) (2.89) (2.74) (2.86) (2.90) 
CFO 0.0238* 0.0458** 0.0269 0.0229* 0.0450** 0.0253 
 (1.40) (2.13) (1.14) (1.33) (2.08) (1.07) 
Liq 0.0037 0.0252** 0.0279*** 0.0033 0.0242** 0.0268** 
 (0.42) (2.32) (2.44) (0.37) (2.19) (2.32) 
Tang -0.0059 0.0029 -0.0024 -0.0056 0.0028 -0.0023 
 (-1.11) (0.41) (-0.30) (-1.05) (0.39) (-0.30) 
ROA 0.0310 0.1305* 0.0985 0.0342 0.1303* 0.0958 
 (0.39) (1.36) (0.94) (0.42) (1.36) (0.91) 
IssueSize 0.0314 -0.1153* -0.0794 0.0296 -0.1142* -0.0761 
 (0.58) (-1.34) (-0.86) (0.56) (-1.31) (-0.81) 
Dacc  0.0064 0.0179  0.0176 0.0317 
  (0.09) (0.24)  (0.24) (0.39) 
Ab_Dexp   0.0201   0.0191 
   (0.74)   (0.70) 
Ab_Prod   -0.0710**   -0.0752** 
   (-2.13)   (-2.18) 
Year Fixed  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 5865 3355 2781 5865 3355 2781 
R2 0.033 0.049 0.063 0.033 0.050 0.063 
Table 8 reports OLS regression results. The variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered within the firm. 
Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the significance of parameter estimates at the 1, 5, and 10 % (one-sided) significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered within acquirer firms.   
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Table 9. Regression of Bond Yield Spread on the Length of MBE String 
Spreadiq = α0 + α1MBE_Stringiq + α2Sizeiq + α3Lossiq + α4StdRetiq + α5Tobin’s Qiq + α6Lev  
              + α7CFOiq + α8Liqiq + α9Tangiq + α10ROAiq + α11IssueSizeiq + (α12Dacci +α13Ab_Dexpiq  
              + α14Ab_Prodiq) + ∑αtYeariq + ∑αtIndustryiq + εiq 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Spread Spread Spread 
MBE_String -0.0051 0.0049 0.0009 
 (-0.57) (0.44) (0.08) 
Size -0.2534*** -0.2767*** -0.2735*** 
 (-21.03) (-20.09) (-18.72) 
Loss 0.2076*** 0.2159*** 0.2276*** 
 (6.20) (4.91) (4.85) 
StdRet 0.0076** 0.0044 0.0021 
 (2.13) (1.02) (0.42) 
Tobin’s Q -0.2982*** -0.3112*** -0.2900*** 
 (-13.16) (-9.74) (-8.17) 
Lev 1.1081*** 0.9713*** 0.9541*** 
 (12.70) (8.97) (8.15) 
CFO -0.2250* -0.0137 0.0426 
 (-1.32) (-0.06) (0.17) 
Liq 0.5950*** 0.4348*** 0.4229*** 
 (4.72) (2.95) (2.79) 
Tang 0.0479 0.0284 -0.0134 
 (0.50) (0.21) (-0.09) 
ROA -2.8839*** -2.8158*** -2.5493** 
 (-3.25) (-2.53) (-2.14) 
IssueSize -1.1926*** -1.3554** -0.9893* 
 (-2.59) (-2.07) (-1.57) 
Dacc  -0.9062* -0.6888 
  (-1.41) (-1.02) 
Ab_Dexp   -0.2376 
   (-0.51) 
Ab_Prod   0.6400* 
   (1.44) 
Year Fixed Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Included Included Included 
N 5853 3346 2773 
R2 0.674 0.707 0.707 
 
Table 9 reports OLS regression results. The variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based 
on standard errors clustered within the firm. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the significance of parameter 
estimates at the 1, 5, and 10 % (one-sided) significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered within 
acquirer firms.  
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Table 10. Regression of Credit Rating on the Length of MBE String 
SP_Ratingiq = α0 + α1MBE_Stringiq + α2Sizeiq + α3Lossiq + α4StdRetiq + α5Tobin’s Qiq + α6Lev  
                              + α7CFOiq + α8Liqiq + α9Tangiq + α10ROAiq + α11IssueSizeiq + (α12Dacci  
                              + α13Ab_Dexpiq + α14Ab_Prodiq) + ∑αtYeariq + ∑αtIndustryiq + εiq 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 SP_Rating SP_Rating SP_Rating 
MBE_String 0.0779** 0.1065** 0.0828* 
 (1.78) (2.03) (1.47) 
Size -1.2662*** -1.3797*** -1.3258*** 
 (-19.00) (-16.46) (-15.57) 
Loss 0.5836*** 0.7112*** 0.8844*** 
 (3.55) (3.46) (3.98) 
StdRet 0.0328** 0.0180 0.0134 
 (1.94) (0.91) (0.61) 
Tobin’s Q -1.2324*** -1.3622*** -1.1907*** 
 (-11.77) (-9.11) (-7.77) 
Lev 6.2776*** 5.9309*** 5.8879*** 
 (13.25) (9.97) (8.89) 
CFO -4.2389*** -2.7594*** -2.4818*** 
 (-6.16) (-3.32) (-2.94) 
Liq 2.3679*** 1.1946 1.4566* 
 (3.14) (1.20) (1.49) 
Tang -0.2024 0.1896 0.0804 
 (-0.43) (0.27) (0.10) 
ROA -22.5811*** -16.6719*** -13.1437** 
 (-5.41) (-3.23) (-2.32) 
IssueSize -4.3814** -0.7472 0.2092 
 (-1.94) (-0.23) (0.05) 
Dacc  0.4706 -0.3881 
  (0.21) (-0.15) 
Ab_Dexp   2.0764 
   (1.18) 
Ab_Prod   3.8403** 
   (1.75) 
Year Fixed Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Included Included Included 
N 5813 3324 2754 
R2 0.696 0.757 0.752 
 
Table 10 reports OLS regression results. The variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are 
based on standard errors clustered within the firm. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the significance of parameter 
estimates at the 1, 5, and 10 % (one-sided) significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered within 
acquirer firms.  
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Table 11. Regression of Equity Market Response on the Length of MBE String 
CAR (-1, 1)iq/ BHAR (-1, 1)iq = α0 + α1MBE_Stringiq + α2Sizeiq + α3Lossiq + α4Tobin’s Qiq + α5Lev + α6CFOiq+ α7Liqiq + α8Tangiq  
                                               + α9ROAiq + α10IssueSizeiq + (α11Dacci + α12Ab_Dexpiq + α13Ab_Prodiq) + ∑αtYeariq + ∑αtIndustryiq  
                                                                      + εiq 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) BHAR(-1,1) BHAR(-1,1) BHAR(-1,1) 
MBE_String 0.0067*** 0.0066*** 0.0070*** 0.0067*** 0.0066*** 0.0071*** 
 (8.12) (6.22) (6.08) (8.10) (6.20) (6.06) 
Size -0.0019*** -0.0018** -0.0014* -0.0019*** -0.0018** -0.0013* 
 (-2.66) (-1.95) (-1.35) (-2.61) (-1.91) (-1.33) 
Loss -0.0035 -0.0029 -0.0051 -0.0036 -0.0030 -0.0052 
 (-1.10) (-0.69) (-1.11) (-1.11) (-0.71) (-1.13) 
Tobin’s q -0.0051*** -0.0071*** -0.0078*** -0.0051*** -0.0072*** -0.0079*** 
 (-3.79) (-4.90) (-4.80) (-3.71) (-4.90) (-4.84) 
Lev 0.0161*** 0.0226*** 0.0254*** 0.0166*** 0.0230*** 0.0259*** 
 (2.67) (2.71) (2.83) (2.72) (2.73) (2.84) 
CFO 0.0183 0.0391** 0.0213 0.0173 0.0383** 0.0197 
 (1.09) (1.86) (0.92) (1.02) (1.81) (0.85) 
Liq 0.0024 0.0242** 0.0275*** 0.0020 0.0232** 0.0265** 
 (0.27) (2.24) (2.42) (0.23) (2.12) (2.29) 
Tang -0.0017 0.0068 0.0013 -0.0014 0.0067 0.0013 
 (-0.31) (0.94) (0.16) (-0.25) (0.93) (0.17) 
ROA 0.0602 0.1498* 0.1175 0.0630 0.1482* 0.1141 
 (0.76) (1.57) (1.14) (0.79) (1.54) (1.10) 
IssueSize 0.0283 -0.1124* -0.0804 0.0265 -0.1114* -0.0772 
 (0.54) (-1.32) (-0.88) (0.52) (-1.29) (-0.83) 
Dacc  -0.0059 -0.0003  0.0052 0.0133 
  (-0.09) (-0.00)  (0.07) (0.16) 
Ab_Dexp   0.0204   0.0194 
   (0.78)   (0.73) 
Ab_Prod   -0.0580**   -0.0623** 
   (-1.85)   (-1.91) 
Year Fixed  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 5865 3355 2781 5865 3355 2781 
R2 0.040 0.057 0.072 0.040 0.057 0.073 
Table 11 reports OLS regression results. The variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered within the firm. 
Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the significance of parameter estimates at the 1, 5, and 10 % (one-sided) significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered within acquirer firms.   
48 
 
 
ESSAY 1 CHAPTER SIX: ADDITIONAL TEST AND ROBUSTNESS TEST 
 
6.1 Interest Coverage Ratio in String Break Quarter 
Interest coverage ratio (Int_Cov) measures a company’s ability to meet its interest 
payments on outstanding debt. As mentioned in Chapter 2, extensive prior studies indicate that a 
break in the earnings benchmark string will trigger a decrease in expectations of future cash flows 
and a disproportionately large negative market response, which will reduce bond yield and increase 
the default risk dramatically. (Fama and French 1989; Shiller and Beltrati, 1992; Campbell and 
Ammer, 1993; Kwan, 1996; Campbell et al., 2008). Therefore, a firm that breaks its string might 
experience low interest coverage ratio as a result of negative market reactions. To test this 
assumption, I define a dummy variable (Break_ES_String / Break_MBE_String) to indicate 
earnings (MBE) string break quarter. I use the following regression model: 
 
Int_Coviq = α0 + α1Break_ES_Stringiq (Break_MBE_Stringiq) + α2Sizeiq + α3Lossiq + α4StdRetiq  
                + α5Tobin’s Qiq + α6Leviq + α7CFOiq + α8Liqiq+ α9Tangiq + α10ROAiq + α11IssueSizei  
                        + ∑αtYeariq + ∑αtIndustryiq + εiq                                                                                (5) 
 
Table 12 reports the results of Models (5) using Break_ES_String (Break_MBE_String) as 
variable of interest. Columns (1) and (2) indicate that earnings (MBE) string firms have significant 
lower interest coverage ratio when they experience break in the earnings (MBE) string. These 
results further confirm that a break in the earnings benchmark string will lower company’s ability 
to meet its interest payments on outstanding debt and thereby trigger an increase in default risk. 
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6.2 The Break in the Earnings Benchmark String 
The regression results from Chapter 5 suggest that the positive association between the 
length of the earnings string and the cost of debt is attenuated, but does not disappear after 
controlling both accrual-based and real earnings management proxies, suggesting that the positive 
relation between the length of the earning string and the cost of debt is not entirely attributable to 
earnings management problems. Thus, in this section, I will examine whether debt holders also 
consider the potential risk associated with a break in the earnings string and ask for higher yield 
spreads.  
As mentioned in section 6.1, a firm that breaks its string will experience low interest 
coverage ratio as a result of negative market reactions, resulting in increased default risk. Thus, 
just like the equity holders, debt holders also have strong incentives to avoid negative stock price 
responses to a break in the earnings string. More importantly, Khurana and Raman (2003) and 
Jiang (2008) find that the debt market is almost dominated by institutional investors and credit 
agencies that are more sophisticated and able to access to firm-specific information. Ke, Huddart, 
and Petroni (2003) and Ke and Petroni (2004) determine that, to avoid a negative stock price 
response to a break in the earnings string, managers, CEOs, insiders, and institutional investors 
obtain private information that allows them to sell significantly more shares at least one quarter in 
advance of the break in the earnings string. Thus, I predict that similar to institutional investors in 
the equity market, debt holders are also able to predict a break in the earnings string and ask for 
higher risk premiums to offset potential losses. 
To test this assumption, I limit the sample to only string firms (earnings string is greater 
than one) and exclude all firms with no string breaking quarter. Next, I define ES_Distanceiq as 
50 
the quarter distance from each earning string quarter to the string break quarter. I use the following 
regression model to test my hypotheses: 
Spreadiq/SP_Ratingiq = α0 + α1ES_Distanceiq + α2ES_Stringiq +α3Sizeiq + α4Lossiq + α5StdRetiq 
                                  + α6Tobin’s Qiq + α7Leviq + α8CFOiq + α9Liqiq+ α10Tangiq + α11ROAiq  
                                  + α12IssueSizei + (α13Dacciq + α14Ab_Dexpiq+ α15Ab_Prodiq) + ∑αtYeariq  
                                  + ∑αtIndustryiq + εiq  (6) 
 
Table 13 reports the results of Models (6) using ES_Distanceiq as the variable of interest. 
Consistent with Table 6, Columns (1) and (2) indicate that the length of the MBE string is 
positively associated with yield spread. More importantly, controlling earnings management 
proxies and the length of the earnings string, the results in in Table 13, Columns (1) and (2) indicate 
that Spreadiq is negatively associated with ES_Distanceiq. These results suggest that the shorter 
distance from each earning string quarter to the string break quarter, the higher the yield spread. 
In other words, debt holders are able to predict the break in the earnings string and, as such, ask 
for a higher risk premium before the break in the earnings string. Columns (3) and (4) indicate that 
SP_Ratingiq is negatively associated with ES_Distanceiq. However, this negative relation is gone 
after controlling for earnings management proxies and the length of the earnings string. These 
results may be attributable to the facts that a credit agency, as an outsider, does not view the break 
in the earnings string as a risk factor. 
 
6.3 Institutional Ownership in Equity Market 
The regression results from Chapter 5 suggest that debt holders view the firms that sustain 
a string of earnings benchmarks as risky borrowers, while equity holds assign higher valuations to 
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the firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks. As I discussed earlier, most of the debt 
holders are institutional investors who are more sophisticated to recognize managers’ opportunistic 
behaviors and the potential litigation and default risks.  If equity holders are dominated by 
institutional investors, then these equity holders would react in the same way as debt holders to 
the firms that sustain an earnings string. To test this theory, I include institutional ownership 
indicator variable, High_IO, into the full sample. High_IO equals to one if a firm’s institutional 
ownership is greater than top quantiles of industry institutional ownership based on Fama-French 
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length of earnings string and the abnormal returns is attenuated by the amount of institutional 
ownership, then I should find a significant negative coefficient on the interaction term between 
ES_string and High_IO. I use the following regression model to test my hypotheses: 
 
CAR (-1, 1)iq/ BHAR (-1, 1)iq = α0 + α1ES_Stringiq + α2High_IOiq + α3ES_Stringiq× High_IOiq 
                                                 + α4Sizeiq + α5Lossiq + α6Tobin’s Qiq + α7Lev + α8CFOiq 
                                                                          + α9Liqiq + α10Tangiq + α11ROAiq + α12IssueSizeiq + (α13Dacci  
                                                                          + α14Ab_Dexpiq + α15Ab_Prodiq) + ∑αtYeariq + ∑αtIndustryiq  
                                                                          + εiq                                                                                                                                             (7) 
 
          Table 14 reports the results of Models (7) using the interaction between ES_String and 
High_IO as the variable of interest. Columns (1) and (3) indicate that the length of the earnings 
string is positively associated with cumulative abnormal returns (buy-hold abnormal returns), 
while this positive association is attenuated by the amount of institutional ownership. Further, 
column (2) and (4) show that significant negative coefficients on the interaction term between 
ES_String and High_IO still hold after controlling the earnings management proxies. These results 
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suggest that equity market’s positive reaction to the firms that sustain a string of earnings 
benchmarks is attributable to the low institutional ownership in the equity market relative to the 
debt market.  
 
6.4 Replication and extension of Jiang’s (2008) results 
Jiang (2008) empirically investigates the influences of beating earnings benchmarks (e.g., 
quarterly earnings from last year, analysts’ earnings expectations, and zero earnings) on the debt 
market and finds that firms that beat earnings benchmarks experience lower costs of debt relative 
to firms that fail to do so. However, as mentioned in section 2.1, Jiang (2008) explores the 
influence of beating earnings benchmarks on cost of debt while ignores the effect of sustaining a 
string of earnings benchmarks on cost of debt. In addition, as shown in Figure 1, Panel A, firms 
with less than 16 quarters of earnings string have a lower yield spread relative to firms with no 
earnings string. However, Figure 1, Panel A also indicates that the mean yield spread increases as 
the length of the earnings string increases after an earnings string reaches eight quarters. Thus, it 
is necessary to examine whether my final sample is able to replicate Jiang’s (2008) results, and to 
investigate why my results are different from Jiang’s (2008).  
To replicate Jiang’s (2008) results, I also include quarterly earnings benchmark indicator 
variable (ES), firm’s research and development expense deflated by total assets (RND), and firm’s 
Standard & Poor’s rating (SP_Rating)8 into model (1). ES equals to one if a firm beats the quarterly 
earnings for the same quarter last year. ES equals to zero if a firm fails to beat the quarterly earnings 
for the same quarter last year. Table 15 reports the regression results of model (1) by using both 
                                                 
8 Jiang (2008) also include subordinated bond indicator variable, call provision indicator variable, and senior bond 
indicator variable in its bond yield spread model. However, my study is not able to include those variable in the model 
as a results of data restriction.  
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ES and ES_String as variables of interest. Consistent with Jiang (2008), Column (1) indicates that 
ES is negatively associated with Spread, suggesting that firms that beat the quarterly earnings for 
the same quarter last year experience lower cost of debt. However, consistent with the results from 
Table 6, Column (2) indicates that ES_String is positively associated with Spread, suggesting that 
the longer earnings string, the higher cost of debt. In order to reconcile this discrepancy, I first 
delete the observations with earnings string greater than and equal to 16 quarters and re-regress 
Spread on ES and ES_String. Thus, ES equals to one if a firm beats the quarterly earnings for the 
same quarter last year and its earnings string is less than 16 quarters. ES equals to zero if a firm 
fails to beat the quarterly earnings for the same quarter last year. Column (3) and (4) indicate that 
both ES and ES_String are negatively associated with Spread. These results suggest that a firm 
beating the quarterly earnings for the same quarter last year experiences lower cost of debt when 
its earnings string is less than 16 quarters. Next, I delete the observations with earning string greater 
than zero but less than 16 quarters and re-regress Spread on ES and ES_String. In this case, ES 
equals to one if a firm beats the quarterly earnings for the same quarter last year and its earnings 
string is greater than 16 quarters. ES equals to zero if a firm fails to beat the quarterly earnings for 
the same quarter last year. Column (5) and (6) indicate that both ES and ES_String are now 
positively associated with Spread. These results suggest that a firm beating the quarterly earnings 
for the same quarter last year and sustaining at least 16 quarters earnings string actually 
experiences higher cost of debt relative to the firm that fails to do so. Overall, Table 15 suggests 
that Jiang’s (2008) results actually depend on the length of earnings string. In other words, a firm 
that beats the quarterly earnings for the same quarter last year experiences lower cost of debt. 
However, this result is reversed when the firm consistently beats the quarterly earnings for the 
same quarter last year for over 16 quarters.   
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6.5 String Firms Only Reduced Sample  
As shown in Table 3, Panel A (B), 36 (32) percent of observation firms fail to beat the 
quarterly earnings for the same quarter last year and analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts. In 
addition, Jiang (2008) finds that firms that fail to beat earnings benchmarks have lower cost of 
debt. Thus, it is possible that the main results in Table 6 and Table 7 (Table 9 and Table 10) are 
driven by non-string firms’ bad performance. To eliminate this concern, I delete all non-string 
firms from final sample and re-test my hypotheses by using the string firms only reduced sample. 
Table 16 reports the results of Model (1) and (3) by using the reduced sample. Consistent with H1, 
the result in Column (1) and (3) indicate that a longer earnings (MBE) string is associated with a 
higher bond yield spread. In addition, consistent with H2, the result in Column (4) indicate that a 
longer MBE string is associated with a lower credit rating. However, as shown in Column (2), I 
do not find any association between earnings string and credit rating. This result is consistent with 
Figure 1, Panel C. Overall, Table 16 indicates that my results still hold using string firms only 
reduced sample.  
 
6.6 Moody Credit Rating 
Morgan (2002) finds that Moody’s rating is systematically different from the S&P ratings. 
Ghosh (2013) argues that while an S&P rating is the agency’s opinion on the probability of default, 
a Moody’s rating is based on expected losses. More importantly, Livingston, Wei, and Zhou (2010) 
find that investors assign more weight to the ratings from Moody’s. Therefore, as another 
robustness test, I estimate Model (3) using Moody’s rating as an alternative dependent variable.9 
Table 17 reports the results of Model (3) using MBE_String as the independent variable. Consistent 
                                                 
9 Moody’s rating scale is from Aaa to C. I transform Moody’s ratings into 21-point scale with a smaller number 
indicating a better rating. 
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with H2, the results in Columns (1) and (2) indicate that a longer earnings string is associated with 
a lower Moody’s credit rating. Columns (3) and (4) demonstrate that a longer MBE string is also 
associated with a lower Moody’s credit rating. Further, these results still hold after controlling for 
earnings management proxies. 
 
6.7 Ordered Logit Model 
The dependent variable, SP_Rating, is an ordinal rather than a continuous measure. OLS 
regressions will assume that the distance between all credit rating categories are all equal, resulting 
in biased results. Using the ordered logit model will relax this assumption. Table 18 reports the 
results of Model (3) by using the ordered logit model. Consistent with H2, the results in Columns 
(1) and (2) indicate that a longer earnings string is associated with a higher probability of a low 
credit rating. This result still holds after controlling for earnings management proxies. Further, the 
results in Columns (3) and (4) demonstrate that a longer MBE string is also associated with a 
greater probability of a low credit rating. Similarly, these results still hold after controlling for 
earnings management proxies. Overall, consistent with the OLS results, firms that sustain an 
earnings string/MBE string have a lower credit rating. 
 
6.8 Alternative Discretionary Accrual Proxies 
There is no consensus regarding the most appropriate discretionary accrual model in the 
earnings management literature. More importantly, Wysocki (2009) argues that the Dechow-
Dichev (2002) cash flow accrual model tends to classify discretionary accruals that are made with 
the intention of smoothing earnings as non-discretionary. Thus, I also use the alternative 
discretionary accrual model suggested by Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijg (2016) to control for 
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earnings management. Specifically, Collins et al. (2016) find that traditional discretionary accrual 
measures based on the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Jones, 1991) or the performance adjusted Jones model (Kothari, Leone, and 
Wasley, 2005) can result in abnormally high or abnormally low rejection rates of the null 
hypothesis of no earnings management raising concerns about the strength of the inferences that 
can be drawn using these proxies. Collins et al. (2016) propose a number of alternative models and 
methods that can be employed to improve the accrual management proxy. I follow their approach 
and include controls for performance and sales growth by adding return on assets (ROA) and sales 
growth (SG) quintile dummies to the modified Jones model and estimate the following regression 
to arrive at our AEM measure: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄2,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑄3,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑄4,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 
                                      +𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡−4 + ∑𝑘𝛽7,𝑘𝑅𝑂𝐴_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−4 + ∑𝑘𝛽8,𝑘𝑆𝐺_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−4 𝑡𝑜 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (8) 
 
Un-tabulated results indicate that my findings still hold if I use an alternative discretionary model. 
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Table 12. Regression of Interest Coverage Ratio on the String Break Indicator Variable 
Int_Coviq = α0 + α1Break_ES_Stringiq (Break_MBE_Stringiq) + α2Sizeiq + α3Lossiq + α4StdRetiq  
                + α5Tobin’s Qiq + α6Leviq + α7CFOiq + α8Liqiq+ α9Tangiq + α10ROAiq + α11IssueSizei  
                        + ∑αtYeariq + ∑αtIndustryiq + εiq                                                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 reports OLS regression results. The variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based 
on standard errors clustered within the firm. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the significance of parameter 
estimates at the 1, 5, and 10 % (one-sided) significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered within 
acquirer firms.   
 (1) (2) 
 Int_Cov Int_Cov 
Break_ES_String -0.0324**  
 (-1.65)  
Break_MBE_String  -0.0626*** 
  (-2.93) 
Size 0.1082*** 0.1094*** 
 (8.17) (7.57) 
Loss -0.1203*** -0.0292 
 (-2.45) (-0.68) 
StdRet -0.0010 0.0001 
 (-0.22) (0.02) 
Tobin’s Q 0.1863*** 0.2028*** 
 (7.03) (7.09) 
Lev -1.6200*** -1.7253*** 
 (-16.55) (-16.20) 
CFO 1.0934*** 1.5637*** 
 (4.76) (6.65) 
Liq -0.1502 -0.3498** 
 (-1.02) (-2.16) 
Tang -0.0145 -0.0574 
 (-0.15) (-0.62) 
ROA 24.1969*** 20.8210*** 
 (15.72) (13.26) 
IssueSize -0.5879* -1.3514** 
 (-1.60) (-2.18) 
Year Fixed  Included Included 
Industry Fixed Included Included 
N 3218 3539 
R2 0.708 0.689 
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Table 13. Regression of Bond Yield Spread/Credit Rating on the Distance of Each Earnings 
String Quarter from String Break Q 
Spreadiq/SP_Ratingiq = α0 + α1ES_Distanceiq + α2ES_Stringiq +α3Sizeiq + α4Lossiq+ α5StdRetiq  
                                  + α6Tobin’s Qiq + α7Leviq + α8CFOiq + α9Liqiq+ α10Tangiq + α11ROAiq  
                                  + α12IssueSizei + (α13Dacciq + α14Ab_Dexpiq+ α15Ab_Prodiq) + ∑αtYeariq  
                                  + ∑αtIndustryiq + εiq 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Spread Spread SP_Rating SP_Rating 
ES_Distance -0.0317*** -0.0387*** -0.0755** -0.0332 
 (-3.36) (-2.64) (-1.75) (-0.56) 
ES_String 0.0214** 0.0350** 0.1038** 0.0352 
 (1.88) (2.05) (2.16) (0.56) 
Size -0.2488*** -0.2632*** -1.2561*** -1.3233*** 
 (-31.72) (-22.86) (-33.56) (-27.73) 
Loss 0.1375*** 0.1684*** 0.6752*** 0.8910*** 
 (3.62) (2.94) (3.30) (3.30) 
StdRet 0.0128*** 0.0136** 0.0329** 0.0031 
 (2.90) (2.12) (1.71) (0.12) 
Tobin’s q -0.2583*** -0.2456*** -1.1254*** -1.0144*** 
 (-16.67) (-10.63) (-16.82) (-10.33) 
Lev 1.1142*** 0.9938*** 6.0030*** 5.4177*** 
 (17.41) (10.28) (19.47) (12.45) 
CFO 0.0592 0.2169 -2.4882*** -1.1160 
 (0.34) (0.79) (-3.15) (-1.05) 
Liq 0.5515*** 0.5252*** 2.0936*** 1.7970*** 
 (5.97) (4.17) (4.62) (3.01) 
Tang -0.0163 -0.0871 -0.7275*** -0.9398** 
 (-0.29) (-0.86) (-2.62) (-2.03) 
ROA -5.2957*** -5.3972*** -34.1941*** -34.2058*** 
 (-5.78) (-3.93) (-7.89) (-5.82) 
IssueSize -0.8928** 0.0669 -0.9198 -3.2098 
 (-2.07) (0.07) (-0.38) (-0.63) 
Dacc  -0.3893  0.8977 
  (-0.91)  (0.52) 
Ab_Dexp  -0.5801*  2.8705** 
  (-1.57)  (1.90) 
Ab_Prod  0.8174***  1.2907 
  (2.39)  (0.93) 
Year Fixed  Included Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Included Included Included Included 
N 3280 1551 3263 1542 
R2 0.696 0.720 0.707 0.777 
Table 13 reports OLS regression results. The variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based 
on standard errors clustered within the firm. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the significance of parameter estimates 
at the 1, 5, and 10 % (one-sided) significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered within acquirer firms.   
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Table 14. Regression of Equity Market Response on the Interaction between Length of 
Earnings String and Institutional Ownership 
CAR (-1, 1)iq/ BHAR (-1, 1)iq=α0 + α1ES_Stringiq + α2High_IOiq + α3ES_Stringiq×High_IOiq 
                                              + α4Sizeiq + α5Lossiq + α6Tobin’s Qiq + α7Lev + α8CFOiq 
                                                                     + α9Liqiq + α10Tangiq + α11ROAiq + α12IssueSizeiq + (α13Dacci 
                                                                     + α14Ab_Dexpiq + α15Ab_Prodiq) + ∑αtYeariq + ∑αtIndustryiq + εiq 
 (1) (3) (4) (6) 
 CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) BHAR(-1,1) BHAR(-1,1) 
ES_String 0.0069*** 0.0055*** 0.0069*** 0.0055*** 
 (5.71) (3.47) (5.68) (3.46) 
High_IO 0.0067*** 0.0052* 0.0068*** 0.0052* 
 (2.90) (1.46) (2.95) (1.47) 
ES_String×High_IO -0.0053*** -0.0038** -0.0053*** -0.0039** 
 (-3.41) (-1.76) (-3.41) (-1.76) 
Size -0.0016** -0.0010 -0.0016** -0.0009 
 (-2.30) (-0.92) (-2.24) (-0.89) 
Loss -0.0040 -0.0068* -0.0040 -0.0069* 
 (-1.22) (-1.40) (-1.22) (-1.42) 
Tobin’s q -0.0049*** -0.0085*** -0.0050*** -0.0087*** 
 (-3.55) (-4.69) (-3.48) (-4.71) 
Lev 0.0165*** 0.0269*** 0.0170*** 0.0275*** 
 (2.64) (2.85) (2.71) (2.86) 
CFO 0.0242* 0.0290 0.0232* 0.0274 
 (1.41) (1.20) (1.34) (1.13) 
Liq 0.0016 0.0254** 0.0013 0.0244** 
 (0.18) (2.17) (0.14) (2.05) 
Tang -0.0056 -0.0013 -0.0052 -0.0012 
 (-1.03) (-0.16) (-0.96) (-0.15) 
ROA 0.0395 0.1074 0.0429 0.1045 
 (0.48) (1.01) (0.52) (0.98) 
IssueSize 0.0319 -0.0782 0.0301 -0.0748 
 (0.59) (-0.79) (0.57) (-0.75) 
Dacc  0.0262  0.0406 
  (0.35)  (0.49) 
Ab_Dexp  0.0124  0.0116 
  (0.45)  (0.41) 
Ab_Prod  -0.0722**  -0.0767** 
  (-2.10)  (-2.14) 
Year Fixed  Included Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Included Included Included Included 
N 5715 2693 5715 2693 
R2 0.038 0.066 0.038 0.066 
Table 14 reports OLS regression results. The variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based 
on standard errors clustered within the firm. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the significance of parameter 
estimates at the 1, 5, and 10 % (one-sided) significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered within 
acquirer firms.  
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Table 15. Replication of Jiang’s (2008) Results 
Table 15 reports OLS regression results. The variables are defined in Appendix A. Non-string firms are the firms that 
fail to beat the quarterly earnings for the same quarter last year. Shor (long)-string firms are the firms with less than 
(greater than and equal to) 16 quarters earnings string. T-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered 
within the firm. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the significance of parameter estimates at the 1, 5, and 10 % (one-
sided) significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered within acquirer firms. 
 
 Full Sample Non-String vs. Short-
ES_String 
Non-String vs. Long-
ES_String 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread 
ES -0.0304**  -0.0412***  0.1147*  
 (-1.72)  (-2.35)  (1.63)  
ES_String  0.0032***  -0.0064**  0.0031** 
  (2.92)  (-1.94)  (2.12) 
Size -0.1087*** -0.1108*** -0.1152*** -0.1156*** -0.1199*** -0.1202*** 
 (-4.67) (-4.80) (-4.99) (-5.00) (-4.53) (-4.60) 
Loss 0.1187*** 0.1198*** 0.1037** 0.1086** 0.1405** 0.1376** 
 (2.39) (2.39) (2.08) (2.17) (2.28) (2.24) 
StdRet -0.0063 -0.0075* -0.0055 -0.0059 -0.0160** -0.0162** 
 (-1.23) (-1.46) (-1.02) (-1.10) (-1.85) (-1.86) 
Tobin’s Q -0.1217*** -0.1357*** -0.1412*** -0.1388*** -0.1638*** -0.1680*** 
 (-4.02) (-4.43) (-4.20) (-4.15) (-4.31) (-4.60) 
Lev 0.0841 0.0982 0.1549* 0.1476* 0.2774** 0.2710** 
 (0.89) (1.04) (1.59) (1.51) (2.20) (2.16) 
CFO 0.6968*** 0.7221*** 0.5885** 0.6137** 0.5984** 0.6392** 
 (2.63) (2.70) (2.10) (2.18) (1.75) (1.86) 
RND 1.2661* 1.3874* 1.4212* 1.3365* 1.4061* 1.4622* 
 (1.42) (1.55) (1.57) (1.48) (1.35) (1.39) 
Liq 0.1664* 0.1793* 0.2771** 0.2725** 0.2870* 0.2792* 
 (1.30) (1.39) (2.13) (2.10) (1.63) (1.58) 
Tang -0.1470 -0.1443 -0.1556 -0.1488 0.0017 -0.0023 
 (-1.03) (-1.00) (-1.09) (-1.03) (0.01) (-0.01) 
ROA -0.3926 -0.8933 -0.3938 -0.4830 -0.0542 0.0231 
 (-0.34) (-0.79) (-0.34) (-0.43) (-0.03) (0.02) 
SP_Rating 0.1393*** 0.1378*** 0.1384*** 0.1382*** 0.1220*** 0.1228*** 
 (17.69) (17.48) (17.03) (17.04) (11.74) (12.30) 
IssueSize -0.8759 -0.9561 -0.8228 -0.7809 -3.3600*** -3.4751*** 
 (-0.79) (-0.86) (-0.70) (-0.66) (-3.15) (-3.24) 
Year Fixed Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 1952 1952 1832 1832 878 878 
R2 0.784 0.785 0.789 0.789 0.797 0.798 
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Table 16. Regression of Bond Yield Spread/Credit Rating on the Length of Earnings 
(MBE) String by using string firms only 
Table 16 reports OLS regression results. The variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are 
based on standard errors clustered within the firm. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the significance of parameter 
estimates at the 1, 5, and 10 % (one-sided) significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered within 
acquirer firms. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Spread SP_Rating Spread SP_Rating 
ES_String 0.0366** 0.0175   
 (1.71) (0.18)   
MBE_String   0.0268* 0.1951*** 
   (1.42) (2.55) 
Size -0.2733*** -1.3125*** -0.2739*** -1.2890*** 
 (-16.32) (-14.69) (-17.40) (-13.50) 
Loss 0.2760*** 1.2834*** 0.2428*** 0.8455*** 
 (4.14) (3.98) (4.43) (3.30) 
StdRet 0.0017 -0.0173 -0.0010 -0.0046 
 (0.25) (-0.62) (-0.16) (-0.19) 
Tobin’s Q -0.2444*** -1.0727*** -0.2685*** -1.1198*** 
 (-6.68) (-6.73) (-7.35) (-7.26) 
Lev 0.9414*** 5.6479*** 0.9154*** 5.5320*** 
 (6.95) (8.13) (7.29) (8.22) 
CFO 0.1227 -1.4435 -0.0057 -2.7531*** 
 (0.35) (-1.26) (-0.02) (-2.75) 
Liq 0.4304*** 1.4414* 0.5598*** 2.1815** 
 (2.50) (1.39) (3.46) (2.10) 
Tang -0.0532 -0.6143 -0.1266 -0.7613 
 (-0.32) (-0.81) (-0.72) (-0.99) 
ROA -3.6514** -23.8649*** -3.1506*** -15.3573** 
 (-2.05) (-3.07) (-2.34) (-2.30) 
IssueSize -1.2836** -0.6385 -0.1713 0.5840 
 (-1.72) (-0.14) (-0.23) (0.14) 
Dacc -2.0255** -3.3965 -1.8250*** -2.2841 
 (-2.24) (-0.97) (-2.38) (-0.72) 
Ab_Dexp -0.5136 1.1254 -0.2881 1.9359 
 (-0.92) (0.55) (-0.61) (0.99) 
Ab_Prod 1.1070** 3.0238 0.9500** 4.9983** 
 (1.99) (1.16) (1.88) (2.07) 
Year Fixed Included Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Included Included Included Included 
N 1650 1642 1959 1945 
R2 0.710 0.778 0.688 0.745 
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Table 17. Regression of Moody’s Credit Rating on the Length of Earnings String/MBE 
String 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Moody_Rating Moody_Rating Moody_Rating Moody_Rating 
ES_String 0.2428*** 0.1780***   
 (8.14) (4.55)   
MBE_String   0.0790*** 0.0736** 
   (2.72) (1.91) 
Size -1.3137*** -1.4052*** -1.3253*** -1.4169*** 
 (-46.57) (-39.78) (-46.52) (-39.67) 
Loss 0.6172*** 0.8251*** 0.6134*** 0.8446*** 
 (5.22) (5.15) (5.17) (5.24) 
StdRet 0.0339*** 0.0024 0.0388*** 0.0043 
 (2.36) (0.13) (2.68) (0.24) 
Tobin’s q -1.2450*** -1.2126*** -1.2156*** -1.1753*** 
 (-23.05) (-16.25) (-22.78) (-15.98) 
Lev 6.1611*** 6.1566*** 6.1338*** 6.1286*** 
 (26.38) (19.52) (26.08) (19.22) 
CFO -3.4862*** -1.4666** -3.6430*** -1.6182** 
 (-6.23) (-1.97) (-6.52) (-2.18) 
Liq 2.2339*** 1.4774*** 2.1530*** 1.4564*** 
 (6.73) (3.44) (6.43) (3.37) 
Tang -0.6770*** -0.3234 -0.6134*** -0.3202 
 (-3.11) (-0.94) (-2.80) (-0.92) 
ROA -25.6434*** -19.2968*** -21.7142*** -16.7277*** 
 (-8.09) (-4.59) (-6.96) (-4.03) 
IssueSize -2.9226** -0.4570 -3.0611** -0.2338 
 (-1.68) (-0.17) (-1.83) (-0.09) 
Dacc  0.1448  -0.0963 
  (0.06)  (-0.04) 
Ab_Dexp  3.0447***  3.2294*** 
  (2.77)  (2.92) 
Ab_Prod  2.8729***  3.1888*** 
  (2.48)  (2.73) 
Year Fixed  Included Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Included Included Included Included 
N 5825 2757 5825 2757 
R2 0.716 0.782 0.714 0.781 
Table 17 reports OLS regression results. The variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered within the firm. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the significance of parameter estimates at 
the 1, 5, and 10 % (one-sided) significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered within acquirer firms.   
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Table 18. Regression of Credit Rating on the Length of Earnings String/MBE String Using 
an Ordered Logit Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SP_Rating SP_Rating SP_Rating SP_Rating 
ES_String 0.1674*** 0.0915**   
 (6.04) (2.26)   
MBE_String   0.1024*** 0.1179*** 
   (4.04) (3.08) 
Size -1.1412*** -1.2695*** -1.1498*** -1.2834*** 
 (-38.26) (-30.46) (-38.23) (-30.41) 
Loss 0.4468*** 0.6337*** 0.4492*** 0.6608*** 
 (4.29) (3.92) (4.32) (4.08) 
StdRet 0.0257** 0.0179 0.0259** 0.0144 
 (2.01) (0.96) (2.03) (0.77) 
Tobin’s q -1.2664*** -1.3248*** -1.2494*** -1.3158*** 
 (-22.67) (-15.31) (-22.51) (-15.35) 
Lev 5.7744*** 5.7565*** 5.7339*** 5.7457*** 
 (24.65) (16.83) (24.55) (16.85) 
CFO -3.6559*** -1.9348*** -3.7999*** -2.0815*** 
 (-7.04) (-2.52) (-7.38) (-2.73) 
Liq 1.8354*** 1.1737*** 1.7810*** 1.1658*** 
 (5.82) (2.67) (5.65) (2.66) 
Tang -0.3239** -0.1616 -0.2414* -0.1139 
 (-1.72) (-0.52) (-1.28) (-0.37) 
ROA -22.0572*** -12.9787*** -19.5084*** -11.8633*** 
 (-7.68) (-3.11) (-6.95) (-2.92) 
IssueSize -4.1621* -1.6103 -4.1546* -1.5703 
 (-1.42) (-0.43) (-1.43) (-0.41) 
Dacc  0.7489  0.4272 
  (0.30)  (0.17) 
Ab_Dexp  2.7000***  2.7699*** 
  (2.72)  (2.81) 
Ab_Prod  3.8751***  4.1336*** 
  (3.34)  (3.52) 
Year Fixed  Included Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Included Included Included Included 
N 5813 2754 5813 2754 
pseudo R2 0.235 0.267 0.234 0.267 
Table 18 reports order logistic regression results. The variables are defined in Appendix A. Chi-square statistics (z-statistics) 
are based on standard errors clustered within the firm. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the significance of parameter 
estimates at the 1, 5, and 10 % (one-sided) significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered within acquirer 
firms. 
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ESSAY 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
 
This study investigates whether the debt market reacts differently from the equity market 
to firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks. Specifically, by using earnings string and 
MBE string as two proxies of earnings benchmark string, I find that the length of the earnings 
benchmark string is associated with higher accumulative abnormal returns, while it is also 
associated with a higher yield spread and a lower credit rating. These results suggest that unlike 
equity markets, which reward firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks, debt markets 
actually punish firms that sustain a string of earnings benchmarks by increasing the cost of debt. 
In addition, the positive association between the length of the earnings benchmark string and the 
cost of debt is weaker, but still holds after controlling for earnings management proxies suggesting 
that this association is not entirely attributable to the information asymmetry between managers 
and bondholders. The results from additional tests indicate that the shorter distance from each 
earnings string quarter to the string break quarter, the higher the bond yield spread, and that the 
positive association between abnormal returns and the length of earnings string is attenuated by 
the amount of institutional ownership. These results suggest that the positive association between 
the length of the earnings benchmark string and the cost of debt is also attributable to different 
investor compositions between debt market and equity market. 
This study makes three contributions to the literature. First, it provides evidence 
demonstrating that debt markets react differently from equity markets to firms that sustain a string 
of earnings benchmarks. In particular, my study suggests that managers need to do a cost benefit 
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analysis before sustaining a string of earnings benchmarks as the increased cost of debt can 
significantly reduce the benefits obtained from the equity market. In addition, my study extends 
Jiang (2008) by testing the relation between beating the earnings benchmark and the cost of debt 
from a cumulative perspective. I find that the length of an earnings benchmark string is positively 
associated with the cost of debt. My findings suggest that future study investigating the relation 
between earnings benchmarks and the cost of debt must consider the length of an earnings 
benchmark string. Finally, my findings extend Ke and Petroni (2004) by showing that bondholders, 
just like institutional investors in the equity market, are also able to predict the break of 
earnings/MBE string and therefore ask for a higher risk premium.   
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ESSAY 2:  TOO GOOD TO BE GOOD: THE INFLUENCE OF SUSTAINING A STRING 
OF EARNINGS INCREASES ON STOCK RETURNS 
ESSAY 2 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Existing research finds that investors fixate on earnings momentum and assign higher 
valuations to firms that sustain a string of earnings increases (earnings string). Several prior studies 
try to explain this phenomenon. For example, by using a psychological theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1975, representativeness heuristic), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) argue that 
investors view some stocks as growth stocks based on a history of consistent earnings growth, 
while ignoring the fact that very few companies are able to keep growing. Similarly, Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) find that investors tend to rely heavily on firms’ past growth rates 
when extrapolating into future returns. Sloan (1996) focuses on the core component of earnings, 
accruals, and argues that investors fixate only on earnings momentum and fail to appreciate the 
lower persistence of accrual quality. Empirically, Barth, Elliot, and Finn (1999) find that the firms 
with longer strings of earnings increases are priced at a higher premium relative to firms without 
this pattern, after controlling growth and risk factors. Similarly, Myers, Myers, and Skinner (2007) 
confirm that firms reporting at least 20 quarters of earnings increases experience higher abnormal 
returns. Yao (2015) further confirm that stock returns are positively associated with earnings 
persistence.  
Prior empirical studies investigating the influence of earnings strings on stock returns 
provide only short-run cross-sectional results. For example, Myer et al (2007) measure abnormal 
returns as the market adjusted average returns from one day after earnings announcement of the 
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last quarter in the string to the day after the earnings announcement for the first decline quarter. 
Barth et al. (1999) measure abnormal returns as the 12-month compound monthly market adjusted 
return, beginning with string firms’ first month. Yao (2015) measures abnormal returns as three-
day window cumulative abnormal return around earnings announcement and cumulative abnormal 
returns over the quarter. Therefore, it is still unknown whether market persistently overestimates 
the firms that sustain a string of earnings increases from a long-run perspective, and consequently 
overprices earnings string.  
Fama (1998) argues that standard error grows with the return horizon (A.K.A bad model 
problem), and that traditional cross-sectional abnormal returns approach ignores the cross-
sectional correlation among individual firms. Thus, the predictability of abnormal return at long 
horizons will be especially low and lead to overstated test statistics. Fama (1998) strongly 
advocates a monthly portfolio approach because the cross-sectional correlations are accounted for 
in the portfolio variance. Therefore, my study tries to fill this gap by investigating the influence of 
earnings strings on stock returns using a time-series portfolio approach. Following prior studies 
(Ke, Huddart, and Petroni, 2003; Myers et al., 2007), I define an earning string as a sequence of 
quarters in which a firm’s earnings before income taxes are higher than those of the same fiscal 
quarter from the previous year. Next, I examine the risk-adjusted return performance of portfolios 
sorting the length of the earnings strings into terciles or quartiles. To compare earnings string firms 
with firms with no earnings strings, I also form a portfolio of stocks with no earnings string. I then 
regress risk-adjusted time-series returns on the Fama-French (1993) three factors (market, size, 
and book-to-marker) and the Carhart (1997) four factors (market, size, book-to-market, and 
momentum), respectively. Finally, I form a zero net investment portfolio following a strategy that 
longs the stock with the top tercile/quartile of earnings strings and shorts the low tercile/quartile 
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of earnings strings. If the positive abnormal returns to the earnings string firms are attributable to 
mispricing, then I should find a significant positive average abnormal return of a zero net 
investment portfolio. 
Surprisingly, I find that firms that sustain a string of earnings increases will initially 
experience higher stock returns. However, as the earnings string becomes longer, market reaction 
becomes weaker. More importantly. I find that the average abnormal return of a zero investment 
arbitrage portfolio that longs the top tercile (quartile) and shorts the low tercile (quartile) is 
approximately negative 65 (75) basis points per month, which is significantly different from zero 
at the 1% level. This result suggests that the portfolio of stocks with shorter earning strings actually 
outperforms the portfolio of stocks with longer earnings strings after adjusting for risk factors. To 
further confirm the evidence from the time-series portfolio tests, I also use Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
two stage cross-sectional asset pricing model to test the relation between earnings string and 
monthly returns. Consistent with the results from portfolio approach, I find that monthly return is 
negatively associated with the length of earnings string. Taking together, these results suggest that 
market does not persistently assign higher valuations to the firms that sustain an earnings string. 
Additionally, I examine the market response to the firms that currently fail to sustain an earnings 
string (non-string firms). Be more specific, I compare the non-string firms that sustained earnings 
string frequently over the past ten years to the non-string firms that did not sustain any earnings 
string over the past ten years. I find that non-string firms that break their string frequently even 
underperform the firms that have no past string at all. Consistent with prior studies (DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner, 1996; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Barth et al., 1999; Brown and Caylor, 
2005), this result suggests that firms that fail to sustain earnings string will suffer 
disproportionately large negative market response.  
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          Overall, these mean reversal results mentioned above can be explained from three 
perspectives. First, consider the overreaction hypothesis. Jensen (2005) argues that if investors 
over-extrapolate past performance and assume firms will continue to grow, then the firms’ stock 
will be overvalued. Further, originally presented by Debondt and Thaler (1985 and 1987), the 
overreaction hypothesis argues that as a consequence of investors’ overreaction to earnings, stock 
prices may temporarily depart from their underlying fundamental values, but will regress to the 
mean subsequently. Thus, if there is subsequent stock price reversal effect for the overvalued 
stocks, then firms that sustain a string of earnings increases will initially experience higher returns. 
However, as the earnings string becomes longer, market reaction will be reversed. 
In addition, this mean reversion can be the result of a break in the earnings string. Agapova 
and Mailibayeva (2016) argue that investors overweigh string signals and under-weigh a firm’s 
actual performance. Thus, a break in the string is likely to cause a substantial market response. 
Empirically, extensive prior studies find that firms sustaining consecutive increases in earnings 
experience significant stock price declines upon breaking the earnings string (Barth et al., 1999; 
DeAngelo et al., 1996). Thus, given the potential negative market response, investors will increase 
their concerns regarding the break in the earnings string as the length of the earnings string 
increases. More importantly, Ke and Petroni (2004) find that institutional investors sell significant 
shares at least one quarter prior to a break in the earnings string, suggesting that sophisticated 
investors are able to predict a break in earnings string and avoid the potential loss in the future. 
Ali, Durtschi, Lev, and Trombley (2004) note a positive association between changes in 
institutional ownership and subsequent abnormal returns, suggesting that institutional investors’ 
trading strategies are able to predict future stock returns. Thus, if the overall market reacts in the 
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same direction as the institutional investors, then the market will assign less value to those firms 
sustaining a longer earnings string.  
Finally, this mean reversion can be the result of increasing agency issues. Jensen (2005) 
argues that once a manager starts reporting earnings increases, it is nearly impossible to stop as 
managers must continue to convince investors that the firm is worth its valuation. Consistent with 
these arguments, prior studies find that managers’ bonuses and careers are closely tied to earnings-
based benchmarks (Matsunaga and Park, 2001; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005). Thus, 
managers will be in a very difficult situation once they realize that a firm’s earnings increase is not 
sustainable. In order to keep their benefits and maintain stock prices in the short run, managers 
have strong incentives to use various types of earnings manipulation strategies to boost earnings, 
which significantly reduces the overall earnings quality and sacrifices the firms’ value in the long 
run. Prior studies find that the market either attaches no rewards or imposes a penalty on firms 
with low earnings quality (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2004; Barton and Waymire, 
2004). Therefore, the market may not assign higher valuation to firms that sustain a long earnings 
string due to lower financial reporting quality. 
My empirical evidence contributes to the literature in three ways. First, my study provides 
further insight into the existing literature by demonstrating that a portfolio of stocks with shorter 
earning strings actually outperforms a portfolio of stocks with longer earnings strings after 
adjusting for risk factors. This result suggests that, from a long run time-series perspective, 
investors do not assign high valuations to firms that sustain a long earnings string. In addition, my 
empirical tests provide support for the overreaction hypothesis. In particular, I find that earnings 
string firms initially experience higher stock returns. However, as the earnings string becomes 
longer, market reaction becomes weaker. This result suggests that the market initially overreacts 
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to earnings string firms and adjusts back subsequently. Moreover, my empirical results have 
important economic implications for finance professionals. In particular, my study finds that 
investors are able to obtain significantly higher abnormal returns if they form a zero investment 
arbitrage portfolio that longs the shorter earnings string firms, but shorts the longer earnings string 
firms. Lastly, by using time-series asset pricing approach, my study further confirms that firms 
that fail to sustain earnings increases will suffer disproportionally large negative price reactions.  
This study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the prior literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes the model and methodology. Chapter 4 reports the data selection 
and the descriptive statistics. Chapter 5 reports the main results, while Chapter 6 provides my 
conclusions.  
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ESSAY 2 CHAPTER TWO: THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
2.1 Existing Literature 
Traditional transaction cost theory argues that investors rely on low cost heuristics, such as 
earnings-based benchmarks, to determine firms’ performance and future prospects as the costs 
associated with storing, retrieving, and processing information is sufficiently high for general 
investors (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Empirically, Ball and Bartov (1996) find that investors 
incorporate past earnings changes in forming future expectations of stock prices. By surveying 401 
financial executives, Graham et al. (2005) determine that CFOs indicate that earnings numbers are 
the key metric upon which the market focuses. Further, from a cumulative perspective, prior 
studies also find that investors fixate on earnings momentum assigning higher valuation to firms 
that sustain a string of earnings increases. Several prior studies try to explain this phenomenon. 
For example, Barberis et al. (1998) provide an analytical model demonstrating that when a positive 
earnings surprise is followed by another positive surprise, investors raise the likelihood that they 
are in a trending regime. Thus, investors view some stocks as growth stocks based on a history of 
consistent earnings growth, while ignoring the fact that very few companies are able to keep 
growing. Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that investors tend to rely heavily on firms’ past growth 
rates when extrapolating into future returns. Sloan (1996) divides earnings into two components: 
accrual and cash flow, and argues that investors fixate only on earnings momentum and fail to 
appreciate the lower persistence of accrual quality. Empirically, Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) 
determine that stock price momentum is captured by the systematic component of earnings 
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momentum suggesting that stock price momentum can be explained by an investor’s earnings 
momentum. Koonce and Lipe (2010) find that investors rely on earnings benchmarks to evaluate 
a stock’s performance only when they are consistent over time. Barth et al. (1999) argue that 
monthly abnormal returns measured as the 12-month compound monthly market adjusted return 
increase almost monotonically with the length of the earnings string. Consistent with Barth et al. 
(1999), Myers et al. (2007) find that firms reporting at least 20 quarters of earnings increases have 
higher annual abnormal returns measured as the market adjusted average returns from one day 
after earnings announcement of the last quarter in the string to the day after the earnings 
announcement for the first decline quarter. Recently, Yao (2015) further confirms that earnings 
persistence is positively associated with abnormal returns measured as three day windows 
cumulative abnormal return around earnings announcement and cumulative abnormal returns over 
the quarter. Together, prior studies investigate the influence of sustaining a string of earnings 
increases on stock returns mainly from a short-run cross-sectional perspective and find a positive 
association between the length of the earnings string and abnormal returns as investors fixate on 
firms that report consistent earnings increases and reward high valuations to those firms. 
 
2.2 Overreaction Hypothesis 
Penman (2003) argues that shareholders’ earnings momentum behavior promotes stock 
price bubbles. Similarly, Jensen (2005) confirms that when investors over-extrapolate past 
performance and assume firms will continue to grow, the firms’ stock will be overvalued. Further, 
originally documented by Debondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), the overreaction hypothesis argues 
that as a consequence of investors’ overreaction to earnings, stock prices may temporarily depart 
from their underlying fundamental values, but will regress to the mean subsequently. Specifically, 
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Debondt and Thaler (1985) find that a portfolio strategy that sells “winners” and buy “losers” is 
able to produce positive expected returns suggesting that an overvalued (undervalued) stock will 
decrease (increase) its value subsequently. In a later paper, Lehmann (1990) provides strong 
evidence rejecting market efficient theory, but supporting the overreaction hypothesis by 
demonstrating that overvalued stock adjust back subsequently. Zarowin (1990) confirms DeBondt 
and Thaler’s (1985, 1987) findings and extends the overreaction hypothesis by confirming that 
stock overvaluation is mainly attributable to a firm’s size. However, Chopra, Lakonishok, and 
Ritter (1992) confirm the overreaction hypothesis even after adjusting for size and beta. Sloan 
(1996) explains the overreaction hypothesis from an accounting accruals perspective and finds that 
the stock market initially overvalues firms that have higher levels of accounting accruals, but 
subsequently lowers its valuation of these firms as a result of accruals reversal. Chen and Sauer 
(1997) further confirm the overreaction hypothesis by demonstrating that the time-series standard 
deviations of rank portfolios follow a U-shaped pattern. Chan, Frankel, and Kothari (2004) also 
provide evidence to support overreaction hypothesis that the sequence of past accounting 
performance is related to short-term returns but not related to long-tern returns, and therefore is 
unlikely to bias investors’ future expectations. 
However, prior research questions the argument of the overreaction hypothesis. Kim, 
Nelson, and Startz (1991) find that mean reversion stock returns are predominately a pre-war 
phenomenon. Richardson (1993) argues that mean reversion in the stock market relies upon the 
random walk theory. Overall, if there is a subsequent stock price reversal effect for overvalued 
stocks, then firms that sustain a string of earnings increases will initially experience higher stock 
returns. As the earnings string becomes longer, the market reaction becomes weaker. 
 
85 
2.3 The Break in the Earnings String 
Penman (2003) argues that once the stock price bubble bursts, there will be a dramatically 
large negative market response. Similarly, Agapova and Mailibayeva (2016) argue that investors 
overweigh string signals and under-weigh a firm’s actual performance. Thus, the break in a string 
is likely to cause a substantial market response. Empirically, Barth et al. (1999) find that firms 
sustaining consecutive increases in earnings experience significant stock price declines upon 
breaking the earnings string. Similarly, DeAngelo et al. (1996) determine that negative market 
response is more pronounced for firms with longer earnings strings. Thus, given the potential 
negative market response, investors will increase their concern regarding a break in the earnings 
string as the length of the earnings string increases. More importantly, Ke et al. (2003) find that 
insiders, such as top managers or CEOs, sell significant shares three to nine quarters prior to a 
break in the earnings string. Further, Ke and Petroni (2004) argue that institutional investors also 
sell significant shares at least one quarter prior to a break in the earnings string suggesting that 
sophisticated investors are able to predict a break in the earnings string thereby avoiding a potential 
loss in the future. Ali et al. (2004) confirm a positive association between changes in institutional 
ownership and subsequent abnormal returns suggesting that institutional investors’ trading 
strategies are able to predict future stock returns. Thus, if the market reacts in the same direction 
as institutional investors, then the market will assign less value to firms that sustain a longer 
earnings string. 
 
2.4 Agency Problems  
From a manager’s perspective, Jensen (2005) argues that once a manager starts reporting 
an earnings increase, it is nearly impossible to stop as managers must continue to convince 
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investors that the firm is worth its valuation. Similarly, Penman (2003) confirms that managers are 
forced to engage in increasingly aggressive accounting in order to match investors’ “unrealistic 
expectations” about their firms’ growth prospects. Consistent with these arguments, prior studies 
find that managers’ bonuses and careers are closely tied to earning-based benchmarks. Matsunaga 
and Park (2001) find that a CEO’s bonus plan is lower if a firm fails to reach the quarterly earnings 
from the prior year. Graham et al. (2005) determine that more than three-fourths of the surveyed 
CFOs agree or strongly agree that their career is closely tied to earnings benchmarks. More 
importantly, Graham et al. (2005) also find that 80% of surveyed CFOs believe that meeting or 
beating earnings benchmarks helps maintain or increase a firm’s stock price. Thus, managers will 
be in a very difficult situation once they realize that a firm’s earnings increase is not sustainable. 
In order to keep their benefits and maintain stock prices in the short run, managers have strong 
incentives to use various types of earnings manipulation strategies to boost earnings, significantly 
reducing the overall earnings quality and sacrificing the firm’s value in the long run. Empirically, 
prior studies find that the market either attaches no rewards or imposes a penalty on firms with 
lower earnings quality. By using an asset pricing test, Francis et al. (2004) find that firms with 
poor financial reporting quality, measured by accrual quality, experience higher costs of equity. 
Conversely, Barton and Waymire (2004) argue that high quality financial information lessens 
investor losses during a stock market crash. Thus, the market may not assign higher valuations to 
firms that sustain longer earnings strings due to lower financial reporting quality. 
Collectively, from a short-run cross-sectional perspective, prior studies find that the market 
rewards firms that sustain a string of earnings increases as investors fixate on earnings momentum. 
However, from a long run time-series perspective, it is still unknown whether market misprices 
earnings string firms. According to the overreaction hypothesis, the market will eventually regress 
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the overvalued stock price to mean subsequently. In addition, a long string of earnings increases 
may also promote investors’ concerns associated with a break in the earnings string. Finally, in 
order to sustain a long string of earnings increases, managers have strong incentives to use various 
types of earnings manipulation strategies to boost earnings, reducing overall earnings quality. Thus, 
by using a time-series asset pricing approach, my study argues that firms that sustain a string of 
earnings increases will initially experience higher stock returns. However, as the earnings string 
becomes longer, the market reaction becomes weaker. In other words, I expect that controlling for 
other risk factors, the portfolio of stock with shorter earnings strings will outperform the portfolio 
of stock with longer earnings strings. 
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ESSAY 2 CHAPTER THREE: MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
 
I first examine the risk-adjusted returns performance of portfolios sorting the length of the 
earnings string into terciles or quartiles. I then regress the risk-adjusted time-series returns (in 
excess of the risk-free rate) on the factors known to affect the cross-section of returns. Specifically, 
I first employ the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model to test my hypothesis: 
 
RP - Rf = α0 + β1(RM – Rf) + β2SMB + β3HML + ε  (1) 
 
where Rp is a particular portfolio’s monthly return, Rf is the one-month Treasury bill rate, RM is the 
equally-weighted monthly market return, SMB (small minus big) is the difference in the monthly 
portfolio return between small- and large-sized firms, and HML (high minus low) is the difference 
in the monthly portfolio return between high book-to-market and low book-to-market firms. 
Next, I estimate the abnormal portfolio returns with the Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
that extends the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model by adding a momentum factor as an 
additional risk factor: 
 
RP - Rf = α0 + β1(RM – Rf) + β2SMB + β3HML + β4UMD + ε   (2) 
 
where UMD (up minus down) is the momentum factor computed as the monthly return difference 
between a portfolio of stocks with  high past 12-month returns and a portfolio of stocks with low 
past 12-month returns. I also construct a zero net investment portfolio following a strategy that 
89 
longs firms with longer earnings strings and shorts firms with shorter earnings strings. The asset 
pricing model for the zero investment portfolio returns is constructed as follows: 
 
RH – RL = α0 + β1(RM – Rf) + βn∑risk factors+ ε   (3) 
 
The arbitrage abnormal return is measured by the difference in returns between the highest 
earnings string tercile/quartile (RH) and the lowest earnings string tercile/quartile (RL). Alpha 
measures the arbitrage abnormal returns. A positive alpha indicates that the portfolio of stocks 
with longer earnings strings outperform the portfolio of stocks with shorter earnings strings, while 
a negative alpha indicates that the portfolio of stocks with shorter earnings strings outperform the 
portfolio of stocks with longer earnings strings. 
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ESSAY 2 CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
4.1 Data 
I calculate the firms’ earnings string variable using the COMPUSTAT quarterly database 
for the periods reported from 1962-2016. More specifically, I define an earnings string as a 
sequence of quarters in which a firm’s earnings before income taxes (EBIT) is higher than that of 
same fiscal quarter from the previous year. Unlike prior studies using a firm’s earnings per share 
(EPS) to construct an earnings string variable (Myers et al., 2007), my study uses EBIT as basic 
EPS does not take into account any stock dilutive effects on EPS. The total earnings string 
observations consist of 1,320,696 firm-quarter observations from 1962-2016. 
Table 19 reports the observation distribution across the earnings strings. Overall, the 
proportion of the observations tends to decrease with the length of the earnings string. Five hundred 
seventy-two thousand one hundred twenty-nine firm-quarter observations (43.33% of the sample) 
report a string of 1-8 quarters, 49,102 firm-quarter observations (3.72% of the sample) report a 
string of 9-16 quarters, 9,874 firm-quarter observations (0.75% of the sample) report a string of 
17-24 quarters, 3,157 firm-quarter observations (0.4% of the sample) report a string of 25-32 
quarters, and 1,263 firm-quarter observations (0.10% of the sample) report a string of 33-40 
quarters. The firm-quarter observations with a string above 40 quarters are only 0.10% of the 
sample. 
The monthly data on the Fama-French (1993) three factors (RM-Rf, SMB, and HML), the 
Carhart (1997) four factors (RM-Rf, SMB, HML, and UMD), and Fama-French five factors (RM-Rf, 
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SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA) are obtained from the Fama-French & Liquidity Factor file through 
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) from 1962-2016. I then match the risk factors data at 
month t with equally-weighted average monthly returns at month t+1 obtained from the CRSP 
monthly file. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 20 reports the mean returns of portfolios sorted into terciles/quartiles and firm 
characteristics variables. The first row of Table 20, Panel A, indicates that, unconditionally, the 
average monthly returns for portfolios with the lowest earnings string tercile and the highest 
earnings string tercile are 2.22% and 1.33%, respectively. The difference between the lowest and 
highest earnings string terciles is 0.89% per month, which is both statistically significant (p=0.04) 
and economically significant. This result provides preliminary evidence that the portfolio of stocks 
with shorter earnings strings outperform the portfolio of stocks with longer earnings strings. 
Further, consistent with prior studies (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; and Caylor, 2005), Table 20, 
Panel A indicates that firms that beat the quarterly earnings for the same Brown quarter last year 
have significantly higher market returns relative to firms that fail to do so. For the firm’s 
characteristic variables, Table 20, Panel A reports that firms with longer earnings strings are 
significantly larger than firms with shorter earnings strings (p>.001). Consistent with Brown 
(2001), this finding implies that growth firms are more likely to report earnings increases. Further, 
Table 20, Panel A indicates that firms with longer earnings strings have lower sales growth relative 
to firms with shorter earnings strings (p<.001). This finding is consistent with Jensen’s (2005) 
argument that in order to satisfy investors’ growth expectations, managers often undertake 
financial reporting strategies that allow them to maximize the firm’s stock prices in the short run, 
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while destroying the firm’s long run value and the ignoring firm’s core business. Finally, Table 20, 
Panel A also indicates that firms with longer earnings strings have lower leverage relative to firms 
with shorter earnings strings (p<.001). Dhaliwal, Lee, and Fargher (1991) find that only all equity 
or low leverage firms have higher earnings response coefficients suggesting that the stocks of low 
leverage firms are more sensitive to earnings. Similarly, the first row of Table 20, Panel B indicates 
that, unconditionally, the average monthly returns for portfolios with the lowest earnings string 
quartiles and the highest earnings string quartiles are 2.24% and 1.47%, respectively. The 
difference between the lowest and the highest earnings string quartiles is 0.77% per month, which 
is both statistically significant (p=<.001) and economically significant. Table 20, Panel B also 
demonstrates that firms with longer earnings strings are larger in size, lower in sales growth, and 
lower in leverage relative to firms with shorter earnings strings. 
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Table 19. Earnings String Distribution 
Length of Earnings 
Strings 
Number of  
Observations 
Number of  
Firms 
Percent of  
Observations 
Percent of  
Firms 
     
0 quarters 683,616 24,362 51.77% 41.81% 
1-8 quarters 572,129 23,672 43.33% 40.63% 
9-16 quarters 49102 7,575 3.72% 13.00% 
17-24 quarters 9,874 1,712 0.75% 2.94% 
25-32 quarters 3,157 544 0.24% 0.93% 
33-40 quarters 1,263 214 0.10% 0.37% 
41-48 quarters  549 87 0.04% 0.15% 
49-56 quarters 300 46 0.02% 0.08% 
57-64 quarters 163 25 0.01% 0.04% 
65-72 quarters 97 15 0.01% 0.03% 
73-80 quarters 72 10 0.01% 0.02% 
80 or more quarters 74 5 0.01% 0.01% 
     
Total 1,320,396 58,267 100% 100% 
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Table 20. Earnings String Index and Firm Attributes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the mean values of firm characteristics for different earnings string terciles or quartiles and mean differences between the highest and the 
lowest groups with corresponding t-statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and10% levels, respectively. 
    Sorted by Earnings String Mean Difference  
   No String Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1-Q3 t-stat  
    (Lowest)  (Highest)    
Panel A: Earnings strings sorted into terciles  
Portfolio mean returns 
(%) -0.15 2.22 1.56 1.33 0.89** 1.77  
Size 5.29 5.58 7.01 7.97 -2.39*** 45.68  
Salesg -0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02*** 2.74  
B/M 1.70 5.43 4.01 5.49 -0.06 -0.07  
Leverage 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.13 0.10*** 14.65  
Liquidity 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.00 -0.25  
          
   Sorted by earnings string Mean difference 
   No String Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1-Q4 t-stat 
    (Lowest)   (Highest)   
Panel B: Earnings strings sorted into quartiles 
Portfolio mean returns 
(%) -0.15 2.24 1.84 1.70 1.47 0.77*** 2.44 
Size 5.29 5.55 6.55 7.06 7.77 -2.22*** -52.15 
Salesg -0.02 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02*** 3.55 
B/M 1.70 5.48 4.11 4.11 5.10 0.38 0.02 
Leverage 0.25 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.10*** 18.51 
Liquidity 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.28 0.27 -0.02 -0.89 
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ESSAY 2 CHAPTER FIVE: MAIN RESULTS 
 
Table 21, Panel A, reports the average monthly portfolio risk-adjusted returns using the 
Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. The estimation of Model 1 across the different earnings 
string portfolios yields intercepts that decrease monotonically in magnitude when moving from 
the lowest to the highest earnings string portfolio. More importantly, this result is consistent 
regardless as to whether the portfolios are sorted into terciles (Panel A.1) or quartiles (Panel A.2). 
Table 21, Panel A.1 indicates that the average abnormal return of a zero investment arbitrage 
portfolio that longs the highest earnings string tercile and shorts the lowest earnings string tercile 
is negative 63 basis points per month, which is statistically and economically significant. Table 21, 
Panel A.2 reports that the average abnormal return of a zero investment arbitrage portfolio that 
longs the highest earnings quartile and shorts the lowest earnings string quartile is a negative 71 
basis points per month, which is also statistically and economically significant. Together, Table 
21, Panel A indicates that the portfolio of stocks with a shorter earnings string actually outperforms 
the portfolio of stocks with a longer earnings string. This is also particularly impressive as earnings 
string portfolios do not need to be rebalanced on a monthly basis, but rather every three months 
(earnings string is constructed based on a firm’s quarterly earnings announcements). Further, the 
loadings on the size factor (SMB), the value factor (HML), and the market factor (RM – Rf) in Model 
3 are all negative and significant regardless as to whether the portfolios are sorted into terciles or 
quartiles. These results indicate that the zero investment strategy that longs longer earnings string 
stocks and shorts shorter earnings string stocks has a negative exposure to the overall market 
movement, small stocks, and value stocks.  
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Further, as reported in Table 19, over 50 percent of quarter-firm observations in my final 
sample have no earnings string. Thus, it is also important to examine the market response to the 
firms that currently fail to sustain an earnings string (non-string firms). Specifically, I look for the 
frequency of non-string firms’ earning string over the past ten years and examine the risk-adjusted 
return performance of the portfolios sorting on past string frequency. The lowest past string 
frequency portfolio contains the firms that did not sustain any earnings string over the past ten 
years. Given the lack of theory on a minimum length necessary for a firm to be considered an 
earnings string firms, I define an earnings string firm as sustaining earnings increase for at least 
two and four consecutive quarters respectively. Table 21, Panel A.3 (A.4) reports the average 
monthly portfolio risk-adjusted returns using the Fama-French three-factor model, where earnings 
string is defined as earnings increase for at least two (four) consecutive quarters. Overall, the 
estimation of Model 1 across the different past string frequency portfolios yields negative 
intercepts, suggesting that market does assign low valuation to the firms that fail to meet earnings 
for the same quarter last year. More importantly, Panel A.3 (A.4) indicates that the average 
abnormal return of a zero investment arbitrage portfolio that longs the highest past string frequency 
tercile and shorts the lowest earnings string tercile is negative 53 (45) basis points per month,  
suggesting that non-string firms that break their string frequently even underperform the firms that 
have no past string at all. Consistent with prior studies (DeAngelo et al., 1996; Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Barth et al., 1999; Brown and Caylor, 2005), these results also suggest that firms 
that fail to sustain earnings increases will suffer disproportionally large negative price reactions.  
Table 21, Panel B reports the average monthly portfolio risk-adjusted returns using the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Similarly, the estimation of Model 2 across different earnings 
string portfolios yields intercepts that decrease monotonically in magnitude when moving from 
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the lowest to the highest earnings string portfolio. This result is consistent regardless as to whether 
the portfolios are sorted into terciles (Panel B.1) or quartiles (Panel B.2). More importantly, Table 
21, Panel B.1 indicates that the average abnormal return of a zero investment arbitrage portfolio 
that longs the highest earnings string tercile and shorts the lowest earnings string tercile is a 
negative 67 basis points per month. Table 21, Panel B.2 reports that the average abnormal return 
of a zero investment arbitrage portfolio that longs the highest earnings quartile and shorts the 
lowest earnings string quartile is a negative 78 basis points per month, which is both statistically 
and economically significant. These results indicate that the alpha estimated by the Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor model is not absorbed by the momentum factor. Together, Table 21, Panel B 
indicates that the portfolio of stocks with shorter earnings strings actually outperforms the portfolio 
of stocks with longer earnings strings. Further, the loadings on the size factor (SMB), the value 
factor (HML), the momentum (UMD), and the market factor (RM – Rf) in Model 3 are all negative 
and significant regardless as to whether the portfolio is sorted into terciles or quartiles. These 
results indicate that the zero investment strategy that longs longer earnings string stocks and shorts 
shorter earnings string stocks has a negative exposure to overall market movement, small stocks, 
value stocks, and momentum factors. Overall, the results in Table 21 indicate that the portfolio of 
stocks with shorter earnings strings actually outperforms the portfolio of stocks with longer 
earnings strings. In other words, investors are able to obtain significantly higher abnormal returns 
if they form a zero investment arbitrage portfolio that longs the shorter earnings string firms, but 
shorts the longer earnings string firms. This phenomenon is consistent with the overreaction 
hypothesis arguing that investors overreact to firms’ past earnings increases and adjust back 
subsequently. 
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Further, Table 21, Panel B.3 (B.4) reports the average monthly portfolio risk-adjusted 
returns using the Carhart four-factor model, where earnings string is defined as sustaining earnings 
increases for at least two (four) consecutive quarters. Panel B.3 (B.4) indicates that the average 
abnormal return of a zero investment arbitrage portfolio that longs the highest past string frequency 
tercile and shorts the lowest earnings string tercile is negative 54 (49) basis points per month. 
Consistent with Table 21, Panel A.3 (A.4), these results further suggest that firms that fail to sustain 
earnings increases will suffer disproportionally large negative price reactions.  
          Next, I test a cross-sectional asset pricing model to further confirm the results suggested by 
time-series portfolio tests in Table 21. Specifically, I estimate a Fama-MacBeth two stage 
regression returns on the length of earnings string and conventional control variables, such as size, 
book-to-market ratio, liquidity, leverage, sales growth, past returns, and industry indicators. 
Additionally, I also add discretionary accruals estimated by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) 
performance matching accrual model because our results might be simply driven by earnings string 
firms’ poor accrual quality. Table 22, Panel A.1 (A.2) reports the effect of earnings string on future 
returns, where the length of earnings string is at least two (four) consecutive quarters. The 
coefficient of ES_string in Panel A.1 (A.2) is -0.0017 (-0.0045) and significant at the 5% (1%) 
level. These results further suggest that market reaction becomes weaker as earnings strings 
become longer. Overall, the results in Table 21 and Table 22 reveal a significant string effect on 
stock returns. Firms with a longer earnings string actually underperform those with a shorter 
earnings string.  
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ESSAY 2 CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines the influence of earnings strings on stock returns by using a time-
series asset pricing approach. From a cross-sectional perspective, prior studies argue that investors 
fixate on earnings momentum. As such, investors assign higher valuations to firms that sustain a 
string of earnings increases. However, from a long run time-series perspective, my study provides 
further insight into the literature by demonstrating that the high abnormal returns assigned to the 
earnings string firms are attributable to mispricing. In particular, I find that the average abnormal 
return of a zero investment arbitrage portfolio that longs the highest earnings string tercile (quartile) 
and shorts the lowest earnings string tercile (quartile) is a negative 63 (71) basis point per month 
using Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. Similarly, the average abnormal return of a zero 
investment arbitrage portfolio that longs the highest earnings string tercile (quartile) and shorts the 
lowest earnings string tercile (quartile) is a negative 67 (78) basis point per month using Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model. These results are both statistically and economically significant. The 
results suggest that the portfolio of stocks with shorter earnings strings actually outperforms the 
portfolio of stock with longer earnings strings. 
This earnings string mispricing effect can be explained from three perspectives. First, the 
overreaction hypothesis argues that as a consequence of investors’ overreaction to earnings, stock 
prices may temporarily depart from their underlying fundamental values, but will regress to the 
mean subsequently. Thus, firms that sustain a string of earnings increases will initially experience 
higher stock returns. As earnings strings become longer, the market reaction becomes weaker. In 
addition, given the large negative market response regarding a break in the earnings string, 
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investors will increase their concerns about potential losses as the length of the earnings string 
increases. Moreover, in order to keep their benefits and maintain stock prices in the short run, 
managers have strong incentives to use various types of earnings manipulation strategies to boost 
earnings, significantly reducing the overall earnings quality and sacrificing the firm’s value in the 
long run. 
My empirical tests provide support for the overreaction hypothesis. In particular, I find that 
earning string firms initially experience higher stock returns. However, as the earnings string 
becomes longer, the market reaction becomes weaker. More importantly, my empirical results 
have important economic implications for finance professionals. In particular, my study finds that 
investors are able to obtain significantly high abnormal returns if they form a zero investment 
arbitrage portfolio that longs the shorter earnings string firms, but shorts the longer earnings string 
firms.
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Table 21. Earnings String Index and Stock Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Fama-French three-factor model  
 Constant RM-RF SMB HML R-squared 
Panel A.1: Earnings string tercile portfolios  
T1 0.0109 1.0129 0.7370 0.0798 0.9266 
(Lowest earnings string tercile) 17.4 68.24 35.29 3.56  
T2 0.0069 0.9432 0.0670 -0.0162 0.6807 
 5.44 32.21 1.6 -0.36  
T3 0.0047 0.9154 -0.2530 -0.1233 0.4979 
(Highest earnings string tercile) 2.46 20.61 -3.87 -1.83  
Arbitrage portfolio -0.0063 -0.0944 -1.0187 -0.2259 0.3105 
(Highest - Lowest) -2.96 -1.9 -13.96 -3.01   
Panel A.2: Earnings string quartile portfolios  
Q1 0.0110 1.0122 0.7531 0.0851 0.9239 
(Lowest earnings string quartile) 17.2 66.61 35.22 3.7  
Q2 0.0071 0.9894 0.3728 -0.0431 0.8242 
 7.61 45.01 12.05 -1.3  
Q3 0.0060 0.9627 -0.0230 0.0025 0.5739 
 3.72 25.87 -0.43 0.05  
Q4 0.0040 0.8872 -0.2116 -0.1679 0.5385 
(Highest earnings string quartile) 2.33 22.6 -3.67 -2.78  
Arbitrage portfolio -0.0071 -0.1280 -0.9896 -0.2684 0.3447 
(Highest - Lowest) -3.6 -2.86 -15.05 -3.9   
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Panels A.1 and A.2 report the estimated coefficients in the time-series tests of the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model for the earnings strings sorted into terciles 
and quartiles, and for the arbitrage portfolios that are formed by longing the highest earnings string tercile (quartile) and shorting the lowest earnings string tercile 
(quartile). 
RP - Rf = α0 + β1(RM – Rf) + β2SMB + β3HML + ε 
where Rp is a particular portfolio’s monthly return, Rf is the one-month Treasury bill rate, RM is the equally-weighted monthly market return, SMB (small minus 
big) is the difference in the monthly portfolio return between small- and large-sized firms, and HML (high minus low) is the difference in the monthly portfolio 
return between high book-to-market and low book-to-market firms. 
RH – RL = α0 + β1(RM – Rf) + β2SMB + β3HML + ε 
where RH (RL) is the monthly return of the highest (lowest) earnings string group. 
Panels A.3 (A.4) reports the estimated coefficients in the time-series tests of the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model for the non-string firms’ earnings string 
frequency over the past 10 years sorted into terciles, and for the arbitrage portfolios that are formed by longing the highest string frequency tercile and shorting the 
lowest string frequency tercile. Earnings string firms are defined as the firms with the length of earnings string at least two (four) consecutive quarters. 
Panel A.3:   Non-string firms’ string frequency over the past ten years (String>1) 
T1 -0.0064 0.9120 0.7854 -0.0771 0.7481 
(Lowest string frequency tercile) -5.13 30.71 18.70 -1.70  
T2 -0.0159 1.0109 0.9010 0.2588 0.8826 
 -18.80 50.36 31.73 8.42  
T3 -0.0120 0.9447 0.6804 0.3637 0.8560 
(Highest string frequency tercile) -13.56 46.15 23.06 11.58  
Arbitrage portfolio -0.0053 0.0287 -0.1133 0.4504 0.1503 
(Highest - Lowest) -3.83 0.90 -2.46 9.19   
Panel A.4:   Non-string firms’ string frequency over the past ten years (String>3) 
T1 -0.0088 0.9223 0.8831 -0.0090 0.7835 
(Lowest string frequency tercile) -7.47 33.10 22.41 -0.21  
T2 -0.0153 1.0086 0.8402 0.2879 0.8882 
 -18.93 52.84 31.12 9.85  
T3 -0.0137 0.9596 0.5694 0.3528 0.7901 
(Highest string frequency tercile) -12.54 38.15 15.73 9.15  
Arbitrage portfolio -0.0045 0.0278 -0.3348 0.3678 0.1647 
(Highest - Lowest) -2.94 0.78 -6.56 6.76   
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Panel B: Carhart four-factor model  
 Constant MKTRF SMB HML UMD R-squared 
Panel B.1: Earnings string tercile portfolios  
T1 0.0117 0.9983 0.7344 0.1430 -0.1084 0.9301 
(Lowest earnings string tercile) 18.77 67.82 35.91 6.29 -7.4  
T2 0.0067 0.9513 0.0411 -0.0054 0.0158 0.6800 
 5.22 31.84 0.98 -0.12 0.53  
T3 0.0052 0.9036 -0.2466 -0.1770 -0.0529 0.4997 
(Highest earnings string tercile) 2.67 20.12 -3.81 -2.52 -1.21  
Arbitrage portfolio -0.0067 -0.0942 -1.0074 -0.3374 0.0725 0.3087 
(Highest - Lowest) -3.07 -1.87 -13.87 -4.29 1.48   
       
Panel B.2: Earnings string quartile portfolios  
Q1 0.0119 0.9972 0.7513 0.1498 -0.1105 0.9279 
(Lowest earnings string quartile) 18.61 66.3 35.96 6.46 -7.39  
Q2 0.0071 0.9984 0.3413 0.0050 0.0039 0.8173 
 7.26 43.76 10.79 0.14 0.17  
Q3 0.0063 0.9607 -0.0464 -0.0139 -0.0264 0.5746 
 3.81 25.32 -0.87 -0.24 -0.7  
Q4 0.0042 0.8833 -0.2190 -0.2066 -0.0185 0.5398 
(Highest earnings string quartile) 2.42 22.1 -3.82 -3.3 -0.47  
Arbitrage portfolio -0.0078 -0.1131 -0.9917 -0.3699 0.1073 0.3525 
(Highest - Lowest) -3.91 -2.49 -15.21 -5.19 2.38   
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Panels B.1 and B.2 report the estimated coefficients in the time-series tests of the Carhart (1997) four-factor model for the earnings strings sorted into terciles and 
quartiles and for the arbitrage portfolios that are formed by longing the highest earnings string tercile (quartile) and shorting the lowest earnings string tercile 
(quartile). 
RP - Rf = α0 + β1(RM – Rf) + β2SMB + β3HML + β4UMD + ε 
where UMD (up minus down) is the momentum factor computed as the monthly return difference between a portfolio of stocks with high past 12-month returns 
and a portfolio of stocks with low past 12-month returns. 
RH – RL = α0 + β1(RM – Rf) + β2SMB + β3HML + β4UMD + ε 
where RH (RL) is the monthly return of the highest (lowest) earnings string group 
Panels B.3 (B.4) reports the estimated coefficients in the time-series tests of the Carhart (1997) four-factor model for the non-string firms’ earnings string frequency 
over the past 10 years sorted into terciles, and for the arbitrage portfolios that are formed by longing the highest string frequency tercile and shorting the lowest 
string frequency tercile. Earnings string firms are defined as the firms with the length of earnings string at least two (four) consecutive quarters. 
Panel B.3:  Non-string firms’ string frequency over the past ten years (String>1)  
T1 -0.0049 0.8800 0.7882 -0.1373 -0.1707 0.7605 
( Lowest string frequency tercile) -3.93 29.86 19.24 -3.01 -5.82  
T2 -0.0134 0.9568 0.9056 0.1572 -0.2883 0.9195 
 -18.64 56.55 38.51 6.01 -17.12  
T3 -0.0106 0.9128 0.6762 0.3066 -0.1579 0.8703 
(Highest  string frequency tercile) -12.38 46.03 24.15 10.00 -8.02  
Arbitrage portfolio -0.0054 0.0299 -0.1131 0.4525 0.0059 0.1488 
(Highest - Lowest) -3.78 0.91 -2.45 8.97 0.18   
Panel B.3:  Non-string firms’ string frequency over the past ten years (String>3)  
T1 -0.0068 0.8797 0.8867 -0.0889 -0.2270 0.8052 
( Lowest string frequency tercile) -5.94 32.70 23.72 -2.14 -8.48  
T2 -0.0129 0.9570 0.8449 -0.1915 -0.2737 0.9235 
 -18.85 59.52 37.82 7.71 -17.11  
T3 -0.0122 0.9235 0.5646 0.2886 -0.1759 0.8078 
(Highest  string frequency tercile) -11.37 37.57 16.30 7.60 -7.25  
Arbitrage portfolio -0.0050 0.0371 -0.3336 0.3843 0.0452 0.1656 
(Highest - Lowest) -3.14 1.02 -6.54 6.87 1.27   
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Table 22. Cross-sectional asset pricing model 
 
 
 
Table 22 reports the estimated coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions on the earnings string and control variables. I use the Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-stage 
approach in the regression of monthly return (Reti,m).  
 
Reti,m = α0 + β1ES_stringi, (m-1, m-3)+ β2Sizei, (m-1, m-3) + β3B/Mi, (m-1, m-3) + β4Liquidityi, (m-1, m-3) + β5Leveragei, (m-1, m-3) + β6Salegi, (m-1, m-3) + β7Preti, m-1 + β8Dacci, (m-1, m-3) 
         + ∑βIndustry dummies + ε   (4) 
 
Where ES_string is the nature log of the length of earnings string from month-1 to month-3. Earnings string is defined in Panel A.1 (A.2) as the length of earnings 
string is at least two (four) consecutive quarters. Size is the nature log of firm i’s total assets. B/M is firm i’s book-to-market ratio. Liquidity is firm i’s liquidity 
measured by the ratio of new liquid assets (total current assets – total current liabilities) to total assets. Leverage is firm i’s leverage measured by total debt to total 
assets. Saleg is the nature log of firm i’s sales at the fiscal quarter-end over the previous quarter’s total sales. Pret is firm i’s past month return. Dacc is the amount 
of discretionary accruals estimated by Kothari et al. (2005) performance matched accrual model 
Panel A.1: Earnings string>1 
ES_string Size B/M Liquidity Leverage 
Sales 
growth 
Pret 
(-1,-2)_ Dacc 
Industry 
dummies 
No. of 
obs 
Average 
R-square 
-0.0017 -0.0025 0.0005 0.0097 0.0153 0.0171 -0.0482 -0.0239 Yes 141,636 0.0869 
(-2.03) (-4.45) (1.40) (2.30) (4.15) (6.19) (-7.25) (-3.52)    
Panel A.2:  Earnings string>3 
ES_string Size B/M Liquidity Leverage 
Sales 
growth 
Pret 
(-1,-2)_ Dacc 
Industry 
dummies 
No. of 
obs 
Average 
R-square 
-0.0045 -0.0034 0.0007 0.0002 0.0115 0.0268 -0.0470 -0.0210 Yes 82,943 0.1264 
(-3.33) (-5.29) (1.76) (0.05) (2.69) (5.23) (-5.24) (-2.44)    
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APPENDIX A 
 
Variable Definitions 
Main Variables 
Spread = the yield to maturity at the issuance date for the largest bond firm it 
issued in year t, minus the Treasury bond yield with similar maturity. I 
also measure spread as the natural logarithm of the initial bond spread. 
SP_Rating = firm’s S&P ratings from AAA (indicating a string capacity to pay 
interest and repay principal) to D (indicating actual default). I transform 
S&P ratings into a 22-point scale with a smaller number indicating a better 
rating. 
Moody_Rating = firm’s Moody’s ratings from Aaa to C. I transform Moody’s ratings into 
21-point scale with a smaller number indicating a better rating. 
ES_String = the natural logarithm of the length of the earnings string measured by a 
sequence of quarters in which a firm’s EBIT is higher than that of the same 
fiscal quarter from the previous year. 
ES =one if a firm beats the quarterly earnings for the same quarter last year, 
and zero otherwise 
MBE_String = the natural logarithm of the length of the MBE string measured by a 
sequence of quarters in which a firm’s actual earnings meet or beat 
analysts’ most recent consensus forecasts before the earnings quarterly 
announcement date. 
CAR (-1, 1) = firm i’s cumulative abnormal returns measured over three days (-1, +1) 
around the quarterly earnings announcement date. 
BHAR (-1, 1) =firm i’s buy-and-hold abnormal returns measured over three days (-1, 
+1) around the quarterly earnings announcement date. 
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Int_Cov =the nature log of firm i’s interest coverage ratio measured by firm i’s 
operating income before depreciation and interest expense divided by 
interest expense. 
Break_ES_String =one if a firm break its earnings string in quarter q, and zero otherwise. 
Break_MBE_String =one if a firm break its MBE string in quarter q, and zero otherwise. 
ES_Distance = quarter distance from each earning string quarter to the string break 
quarter. 
MBE_Distance = quarter distance from each MBE string quarter to the string break 
quarter. 
High_IO =one if a firm’s institutional ownership is higher than top quantile of 
industry institutional ownership based on Fama-French 8 industry 
categiories 
Control Variables 
Size = the nature logarithm of firm i’s total assets at the end of quarter q. 
Loss = one if loss is in the current fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
StdRet = the standard deviation of firm i’s daily stock returns during quarter q. 
Tobin’s Q =firm i’s market value of assets/the book value of assets at the end of 
quarter q. 
Lev =firm i’s total debt/total assets at the end of quarter q. 
CFO =firm i’s operating cash flow/total assets at the end of quarter q. 
Liq = the ratio of new liquid assets (total current assets – total current 
liabilities) to total assets at the end of quarter q. 
Tang =the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment over total assets at the end 
of quarter q. 
ROA =firm i’s return on assets at the end of year t measured by income before 
extraordinary items scaled by average total assets (quarter q-1 and 1). 
RND =firm i’s research and development expense deflated by total assets. 
IssueSize =the natural logarithm of the offering amount of the bond (in millions of 
dollars). 
Dacc = firm i’s quarterly discretionary accruals measured by a modified 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) cash flow accrual model. 
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Ab_Dexp = firms i’s quarterly abnormal expenditures measured by 
Roychowdhury’s (2006) real earnings management model. 
Ab_Prod = firms i’s quarterly abnormal production measured by Roychowdhury’s 
(2006) real earnings management model. 
 
 
